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ABSTRACT
You, too, can sue Donald Trump under the Emoluments Clause!
Since Inauguration Day, several lawsuits have been filed against President Trump
because of his refusal to divest certain assets. They assert that Trump’s business in-
terests conflict with the Emoluments Clause of Article I. That arcane provision
forbids certain federal officials from accepting any perquisite or gain from a foreign
monarch or state. The suits contend, for example, that a foreign dignitary’s booking
of a room at the Trump International Hotel in Washington, D.C. would constitute
an unlawful emolument.
Most commentators quickly threw cold water on the prospect of any plaintiff pre-
vailing. The trouble, they argued, is that plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a concrete and
particularized injury from any putative violation of the Emoluments Clause. In legal-
ese, they lack Article III standing. This skepticism was vindicated in December 2017,
when a federal court dismissed one of the lawsuits for lack of Article III standing.
What no one has suggested is that plaintiffs do not need Article III standing to
enforce the Emoluments Clause against Trump. Everyone assumes that these suits
must live or die under federal standing doctrine. But, as we argue, Article III standing
is essentially never a barrier to enforcing federal law. Indeed, plaintiffs may even
win a merits ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court without ever possessing the ele-
ments of Article III standing.
If we are right, it is a big deal. Federal standing doctrine is understood to restrain
federal courts from performing an advisory function. It also checks congressional
power, preserving the Executive’s constitutional prerogative to enforce federal law.
We challenge this received wisdom and argue that the Supreme Court has—perhaps
unwittingly—created a route by which litigants may circumvent Article III’s standing
requirements, diminishing the doctrine’s force. This has implications far beyond the
Emoluments Clause; many constitutional and statutory provisions have long been
thought effectively unenforceable because of the strictures of Article III standing.
This Article charts the course that no-standing plaintiffs may follow to enforce
federal law and land in the U.S. Supreme Court. It also introduces a new term to the
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legal lexicon: the Federal–State Standing Gap. This term describes the space between
Article III standing doctrine and the comparatively lax doctrine of many states. We
did not discover this space; everyone who has taken or taught a course on federal
jurisdiction knows about it. But we do think it has gone underappreciated. And that
is the gap in the literature that this Article begins to fill.
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INTRODUCTION
This year is shaping up to be unprecedented in terms of popular familiarity with
obscure constitutional provisions. Following Donald Trump’s November 2016 win
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in the Electoral College, many anti-Trump voters discovered an appreciation for the
convoluted mechanism by which the President is selected.1 Some engaged in a last-
ditch effort to take advantage of it, urging electors to vote faithlessly and deny Trump
the presidency.2 Once that effort failed, attention shifted to the Emoluments Clause
of Article I, which forbids any “Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust” from
“accept[ing] . . . any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever,
from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”3 The word “emolument” is an archaic way
of saying “perquisite, advantage, profit, or gain.”4 Even before Election Day, experts
speculated that if President Trump did not divest from his estimable business hold-
ings, he might be in violation of the Emoluments Clause from his first day in office.5
Some have contended, for example, that any foreign dignitary’s booking of a room
at the Trump International Hotel in Washington, D.C., would constitute an unlawful
emolument.6 Trump’s refusal to divest has thrust the issue into the headlines.7
Immediately after Inauguration Day, a group of ethics advocates and legal
scholars sued President Trump in federal court, hoping to put this Emoluments
1 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 2–4; U.S. CONST. amend. XII; 3 U.S.C. §§ 1–21 (2012).
2 See Ed Pilkington, Electoral College’s ‘Faithless Electors’ Fail to Stop Trump but
Land Democratic Blow, GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2016, 18:37 EST), https://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2016/dec/19/electoral-college-revolt-faithless-electors-analysis [https://perma
.cc/Z63J-ML2V].
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. The Constitution also contains a so-called “Domestic
Emoluments Clause,” see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7, but it is not our focus.
4 Emolument, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). We would agree with anyone
who objects that “perquisite” is itself archaic. And we don’t mean to imply that Black’s
provides the singular, accepted definition of the term. For historical context, see Emolument,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Emolument, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed.
1891). For a rundown of the possibilities, see John Mikhail, The Definition of “Emolument”
in English Language and Legal Dictionaries, 1523–1806 (June 30, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2995693.
5 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed, Trump May Violate the Constitution on Day
One, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-chem
erinsky-trump-emoluments-20170111-story.html [https://perma.cc/3QH4-QNSQ]; Trump Con-
flicts Could Violate the Constitution on Day 1, Lawyers Say, NPR (Dec. 23, 2016, 5:07 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2016/12/23/506686937/conflicts-could-have-trump-violating-the-con
stitution-on-day-1-lawyers-say [https://web.archive.org/web/20170630071202/https://www
.npr.org/2016/12/23/506686937/conflicts-could-have-trump-violating-the-constitution-on
-day-1-lawyers-say].
6 See Jim Zarroli, Ethics Experts File Lawsuit Saying Trump’s Overseas Interests
Violate Constitution, NPR (Jan. 23, 2017, 9:19 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo
-way/2017/01/23/511183740/ethics-experts-to-file-lawsuit-saying-trumps-overseas-interests
-violate-constitu [https://web.archive.org/web/20180107021941/https://www.npr.org/sections
/thetwo-way/2017/01/23/511183740/ethics-experts-to-file-lawsuit-saying-trumps-overseas
-interests-violate-constitu].
7 See Chase Peterson-Withorn, Trump Refuses to Divest Assets, Passes Control to Sons,
FORBES (Jan. 11, 2017, 11:41 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chasewithorn/2017/01/11
/donald-trump-will-hand-over-business/#599c6d7460d7 [https://perma.cc/PTV7-DB4M].
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Clause theory to the test.8 In doing so, they dragged yet another arcane constitutional
provision into the spotlight: Article III’s limit of federal jurisdiction to “Cases” and
“Controversies,”9 as embodied in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on standing.10
The group who brought the lawsuit was Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington (CREW).11 Most commentators doubted CREW’s prospects for success,
arguing that the organization cannot obviously show a “concrete and particularized”12
injury from any violation of the Emoluments Clause.13 In legalese, CREW seems to
lack Article III standing. CREW argued that its diversion of resources to combat the
President’s alleged violations constitutes the injury.14 At least one commentator
agreed.15 But to improve its prospects, CREW joined D.C. hoteliers to the lawsuit,16 in
the hope that they will have standing to sue. In December 2017, the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York dismissed the suit, concluding that neither
CREW nor the hoteliers had Article III standing.17 That is not the end of the matter,
though. CREW has hinted at an appeal.18 Maryland and the District of Columbia have
8 See Zarroli, supra note 6. We take no position on this lawsuit’s wisdom or likelihood
of success. Our interest here is academic and relates only to the question of standing.
9 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
10 See discussion infra Section I.A.
11 Complaint, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-
00458-RA (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2017); First Amended Complaint, Citizens for Responsibility
& Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00458-RA (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2017); Second
Amended Complaint, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 1:17-
cv-00458-RA (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2017).
12 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (making a “concrete and partic-
ularized” injury a standing requirement).
13 See, e.g., Josh Blackman, CREW’s Self-Inflicted Injury in the Emoluments Clause
Challenge, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Jan. 22, 2017), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/01
/22/crews-self-inflicted-injury-in-the-emoluments-clause-challenge/ [https://perma.cc/48WJ
-9TN5]; Andrew Hessick, Standing and the Emoluments Clause, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE
& COMMENT BLOG (Jan. 23, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/standing-and-the-emoluments
-clause/ [https://perma.cc/66TK-X643].
14 See Blackman, supra note 13.
15 See Jonathan Taylor, There’s Unquestionably Standing in the CREW Case. Here’s
Why., TAKE CARE (Apr. 19, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/there-s-unquestionably
-standing-in-the-crew-case-here-s-why [https://perma.cc/D5DW-2FAM].
16 See David A. Fahrenthold & Jonathan O’Connell, Two Plaintiffs Join Suit Against
Trump, Alleging Breach of Emoluments Clause, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/two-plaintiffs-join-suit-against-trump-alleging-breach-of
-emoluments-clause/2017/04/17/1d4aaa70-238a-11e7-a1b3-faff0034e2de_story.html?utm
_term=.e48a9f1dd0e6 [http://perma.cc/T8L5-NAU2].
17 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00458-
GBD (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2017).
18 See Press Release, CREW, CREW Statement on Emoluments Ruling (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://www.citizensforethics.org/press-release/crew-statement-emoluments-ruling/ [https://
perma.cc/Y4SH-TM3T].
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filed similar suits in federal court.19 They may hope to avoid CREW’s difficulties
by taking advantage of the “special solicitude” states are afforded in the standing
analysis.20 The implication is clear: lawyers everywhere doubt that regular citizens
can sue the President to stop him from violating the Emoluments Clause.21
What no one has suggested, as far as we can tell, is that plaintiffs like CREW
do not need standing to enforce the Emoluments Clause against Trump. Everyone
assumes that these plaintiffs must live or die under the federal rules of standing.22
But, as we argue in this Article, lack of Article III standing is essentially never a
barrier to enforcing federal law. Indeed, plaintiffs may gain a merits ruling from the
U.S. Supreme Court without ever possessing the elements of standing.
If we are right, it is a big deal. Federal standing doctrine has long been thought
to restrain federal courts’ power, preventing the judiciary from performing an advi-
sory function.23 It also operates as a check on congressional power, preserving for
the Executive the prerogative to enforce federal law.24 We take issue with this re-
ceived wisdom and argue that the Supreme Court has—perhaps unwittingly—created
a route by which litigants may circumvent standing requirements, diminishing the
doctrine’s force.25
19 See Aaron C. Davis & Karen Tumulty, D.C. and Maryland AGs: Trump ‘Flagrantly
Violating’ Emoluments Clause, WASH. POST (June 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/investigations/dc-and-marylands-lawsuit-trump-flagrantly-violating-emoluments-clause
/2017/06/12/8a9806a8-4f9b-11e7-be25-3a519335381c_story.html?utm_term=.f4bc23b84e10
[https://perma.cc/4J2M-Z4LK]. Bracket the question whether the District of Columbia is
entitled to special solicitude as a nonstate.
20 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
21 See Blackman, supra note 13; Hessick, supra note 13; see also Cristian Farias,
‘Emoluments’ Lawsuit Against Trump May Get Kicked Out of Court, HUFFPOST (Jan. 23, 2017,
9:11 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-emoluments-lawsuit-crew
_us_58866248e4b096b4a233ceed [https://perma.cc/244G-DELN]; Daniel Fisher, Why the
Constitutional Lawsuit Against Trump Is Likely to Fail, FORBES (Jan. 22, 2017, 10:00 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2017/01/22/sure-trumps-foreign-customers-are
-a-problem-but-lawsuits-arent-the-solution/; Jeremy Venook, The Case(s) Against Trump,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/03/the
-search-for-standing/520467 [https://perma.cc/VWQ6-H4XM].
22 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Opinion, Why CREW’s Emoluments Clause Lawsuit
Against President Trump Still Has Standing Problems, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/04/19
/why-crews-emoluments-clause-lawsuit-against-president-trump-still-has-standing-problems
/?utm_term=.0e42c1e0c88e [https://perma.cc/9WQG-GN9V]; Farias, supra note 21.
23 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 598 n.4 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
24 If Congress could confer standing to sue on any private litigant, it would arguably
impinge on the Executive’s authority to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. For a discourse on Article III standing as a separation of powers
mechanism, see Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
25 See discussion infra Section II.A.
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Perhaps more importantly, many putative violations of federal law go unexam-
ined because it is unclear whether anyone has standing to sue in federal court.26
Examples include certain violations of the Establishment Clause,27 Statement and
Account Clause,28 and Incompatibility Clause.29 Scholars have reflected on this prob-
lem, characterizing these and other provisions, such as the Take Care Clause, as func-
tionally unenforceable.30 And the problem may extend to certain federal statutes such
as the Fair Credit Reporting Act31 and Telephone Consumer Protection Act.32
Our thesis therefore has implications far beyond CREW, Trump, and the Emolu-
ments Clause. We propose that, under current doctrine, standing is essentially never
a hurdle to enforcing any federal law—constitutional or otherwise. Almost any litigant
can bring almost any federal claim, obtain relief, and, if the matter is sufficiently
important, obtain a judgment from the U.S. Supreme Court. This means two things.
First, federal laws traditionally regarded as unenforceable are almost certainly en-
forceable by someone. Second, the pool of plaintiffs who can sue under federal laws
not traditionally considered difficult to enforce is broader than previously thought.
Parties who would normally be kicked out of federal court for lack of standing have
a path to federal review and, possibly, victory.
How can this be? The answer appears simple at first, especially to anyone who
has ever taken or taught a course on federal jurisdiction: litigants should migrate to
state court. State courts are not subject to Article III and its standing requirement.33
Many states consequently decline to require anything like Article III standing to sue
in their courts,34 creating what we call the Federal–State Standing Gap.
Here, in brief, is how our method works. We use CREW’s Emoluments Clause
suit as an example. As noted, a federal court dismissed CREW’s lawsuit for lack of
26 See, e.g., John M. Bickers, Standing on Holy Ground: How Rethinking Justiciability
Might Bring Peace to the Establishment Clause, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 449 (2012) (“The
disputes are literally of only academic interest, however, as no one appears to have standing
to complain.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law
Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984).
27 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
29 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
30 See, e.g., Bickers, supra note 26, at 449; David R. Dow, The Equal Protection Clause
and the Legislative Redistricting Cases—Some Notes Concerning the Standing of White
Plaintiffs, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1123, 1128 (1997) (“When a constitutional violation injures a
significantly large number of citizens, no one has standing to sue.”).
31 Gavin Rooney et al., State Courts May Become Sole No-Injury Class Action Forum,
LAW360 (Jan. 8, 2016, 10:54 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/743588/state-courts
-may-become-sole-no-injury-class-action-forum [https://perma.cc/ERK9-LXZ6].
32 Id.
33 See id.
34 See id.
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standing.35 Dismissals for lack of standing amount to dismissals for lack of jurisdic-
tion and are without prejudice, so the group is free to appeal and perhaps refile else-
where.36 Instead of appealing or scrounging around for plaintiffs more likely to have
standing in federal court, CREW should refile under its own name in some state
court with relaxed standing requirements. State standing requirements, including those
states with the most relaxed rules, are discussed in Section I.B. The defendant—
Trump—will doubtless attempt to remove the case to federal court,37 anticipating
another dismissal for lack of standing. As we explain in Section II.A.1, removal is
unlikely. The case is, for now, stuck in state court.38
CREW can seek in state court precisely what it would have sought from the lower
federal courts. It can obtain relief—perhaps including a national injunction barring
Trump from violating the Emoluments Clause.39 It may win appeals up to the highest
state court, which can issue a precedential opinion in its favor.40 CREW might be
quite pleased at this point, despite never having appeared in federal court. But the case
is not over yet. The President will almost certainly petition the U.S. Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court will likely grant it.
What happens next? One might assume that the Supreme Court is required to
dismiss for lack of standing. But that is not our law. In ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,41 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that it had the authority to review an Arizona Supreme
Court decision regardless of whether the plaintiffs had Article III standing.42 Em-
ploying a kind of legal jiu jitsu, the Court flipped the standing inquiry on its head.43
It found that there was federal jurisdiction because the defendants, not the plaintiffs,
had standing.44 The Court then ruled on the merits in the plaintiffs’ favor, affirming
the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court.45 We describe the ASARCO decision
in Part II.
There you have it. The ASARCO plaintiffs were able to obtain victory in the U.S.
Supreme Court without ever having to satisfy the standing requirement of Article III.46
35 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00458-
GBD (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2017).
36 See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
37 See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2012).
38 See discussion infra Section II.A.1; see also ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605
(1989).
39 See discussion infra Section III.A.
40 See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 612–24.
41 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
42 See generally id.
43 See generally id.
44 Id. at 618. More puzzlingly—and as discussed at length in Section IV.A—the standing-
conferring injury identified by the Court was the state-court judgment entered against the
defendant in the very case under review.
45 Id. at 633.
46 Id.
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CREW could do the same. So might nearly anyone who wished to enforce a federal
law previously thought unenforceable. The Federal–State Standing Gap allows almost
anyone to bring a suit under almost any federal law. ASARCO clears a path to bring
that victory to the highest federal court in the land.47
If ASARCO’s reasoning seems peculiar, we agree. In Section IV.A, we consider
whether the decision is likely to be overturned. If it were, the Supreme Court would be
obliged to dismiss the CREW suit for lack of jurisdiction, leaving the state-court judg-
ment unmolested. As we discuss in Section IV.B, this would lead to another strange
result. It would mean that many state-court decisions resolving important federal-law
questions would be unreviewable by any federal court. Such a regime could allow—
and perhaps invite—state courts to defy holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court.
What should we think of all of this? Impact litigators may be ecstatic to find that
federal violations previously thought irremediable can, under ASARCO, be litigated
before the U.S. Supreme Court. One might wonder why they aren’t already taking
advantage of the rule, a question we consider in Part III. Others may be less enthusi-
astic. To them, it might appear that we are caught between Scylla and Charybdis—a
world either with or without ASARCO. In the former, Article III’s standing requirement
is subverted. In the latter, many state decisions become immune from federal review,
perhaps inviting state courts to ignore the U.S. Supreme Court. How worried should
we be about either possibility? Should we prefer one to the other? Section IV.B takes
up these questions. And if one is unenthusiastic about both outcomes, one might won-
der whether anyone—Congress, the Supreme Court, the President—might fashion
a third way. We discuss this possibility in Section IV.C.
I. THE FEDERAL–STATE STANDING GAP
Many people care about the law’s enforcement—or at least they should. This is
especially so when constitutional values are at stake. They should care very much,
for example, about whether the government is promulgating laws respecting an
establishment of religion, discriminating on the basis of race, or employing individu-
als ineligible for office. But if the provisions relevant to those questions are violated,
often no one can do anything about it—at least not in federal court.48
The case-or-controversy requirement of the Article III places strict limits on who
can sue in federal court.49 Those whom Article III permits to sue are said to have
“standing.”50 In many cases, the class of individuals who have standing is dwarfed
by the class of those who would like it.51 In some cases, it is unlikely that anyone
47 Id.
48 See Rooney et al., supra note 31.
49 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–62 (1992); see also Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007).
50 See Scalia, supra note 24, at 882; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
731–32 (1972) (defining “standing”).
51 See Scalia, supra note 24, at 891–92.
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can sue.52 And even when someone has the right to sue in federal court, standing
doctrine often weeds out those most interested in doing so.53 Thus, for many litigants
on both sides of the political divide, federal standing doctrine has long appeared an
insurmountable barrier to enforcing the law.54
Contrast Article III’s limit on who has standing to sue in federal court with the
absence of any such limit on who has standing to sue in state court. Standing to sue
in state court is a matter of state law.55 Many states have taken advantage of this
autonomy to throw their courthouse doors open to just about anyone.56 The result
is a gap between a litigant’s standing to sue in federal court and that same litigant’s
standing to sue about the same alleged wrongdoing in state court. Call it the Federal–
State Standing Gap.
Part I begins with an overview of federal standing doctrine and illustrations of
how federal standing doctrine impedes the enforcement of federal law. Readers famil-
iar with this material may prefer to skip to the discussion of state standing doctrine
that follows. Part I concludes with reflection on the magnitude of the Federal–State
Standing Gap, its consequences, and its opportunities for litigants.
A. Federal Standing
1. Doctrine
Try to explain federal standing doctrine to a non-lawyer, or even to a lawyer
who never took a class on federal jurisdiction. You are sure to get strange looks.
Something is counterintuitive about the proposition that someone could disregard
federal law, even in an obvious way, and yet remain practically immune from suit
in federal court. It does not clarify much to explain that standing doctrine comes from
Article III, as an implicit limitation on “the judicial Power” that extends to “Cases”
and “Controversies.”57 Some have therefore taken to a historical explanation that
focuses on a gradual shift in the federal docket.58
To make a long story short: Courts once were primarily in the business of private
dispute resolution, but with the rise of the administrative state during the last cen-
tury, they increasingly met the claims of citizen-plaintiffs seeking to calibrate and
wield federal power.59 Tough questions then arose about the propriety of private
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 26, at 3–4.
55 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989); see also Pennell v. City of San
Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988).
56 See, e.g., Rooney et al., supra note 31.
57 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
58 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,”
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165–68 (1992).
59 See id. at 194–95; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword, The Court and the
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enforcement of the law.60 Private enforcement seems fine when the citizen-plaintiff
resembles a traditional litigant, alleging that some legal wrong has inflicted harm.61
But what if the allegation is that a federal agency misread a federal statute and thereby
increased the rate of extinction of endangered species in Egypt and Sri Lanka?62 It
is this sort of nontraditional claim that has caused the Supreme Court to define and
reinforce boundaries on who can sue in federal court.63
Under current case law, plaintiffs must demonstrate three things to have stand-
ing to sue in federal court.64 First is an injury in fact.65 This means concrete and par-
ticularized harm, even intangible harm, but not harm in the abstract.66 And the harm
must be actual or imminent, not speculative or conjectural.67 Second is that the injury
is fairly traceable to the defendant.68 This is a causation requirement—plaintiffs can-
not sue defendants to recover for the acts of third parties not before the court,69 nor
can their theory of the case depend on an attenuated chain of events.70 Third is that
the injury is redressable by a favorable ruling from the court.71 The requirement of
redressability is grounded in the federal judiciary’s longstanding aversion to advi-
sory opinions.72 If a favorable judgment can bring only psychic satisfaction, then it
is thought to be nothing more than a conclusion that one side had the better of an
argument in the “rarified atmosphere of a debating society.”73
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1984) (“Once, the Court was principally an arbiter
of disputes among private parties.”).
60 See Fallon, supra note 26, at 1–8.
61 In the argot of legal theory, such a litigant is styled “Hohfeldian,” following Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld’s Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 26, at 3 n.12 (“The terms ‘Hohfeldian’
and ‘non-Hohfeldian’ plaintiff have become terms of art in modern literature on standing.”).
62 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992).
63 Such a claim is nontraditional in the sense of being non-Hohfeldian. See discussion
supra note 61; see also Scalia, supra note 24, at 881–82; Sunstein, supra note 58, at 194–95.
64 Together these are “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing.” Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560.
65 Id.
66 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548–49 (2016).
67 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
68 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
69 See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976).
70 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 (1984).
71 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 41–46.
72 See 13 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529.1
(3d ed. 2017) (“The oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability is that
federal courts will not give advisory opinions.”); see also Correspondence of the Justices
(1793), in RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 50–52 (7th ed. 2015).
73 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
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2. How the Doctrine Impedes Enforcement of Federal Law
This triad of federal standing doctrine—injury in fact, traceability, and redress-
ability—has bite. Standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suing in federal court,74
and the absence of any one of the triad deprives a court of power to adjudicate a plain-
tiff’s claims.75 It is also a constitutional doctrine, deriving from Article III.76 Congress
therefore cannot be sure that any statutory effort to expand a class of potential plain-
tiffs will hold up to judicial review.77
Courts regularly invoke standing doctrine to deny parties redress of alleged
harms.78 While such decisions matter a great deal to the plaintiffs denied a judicial
forum, they are usually of little significance to anyone else. That is because, in most
cases, even though some plaintiffs lack standing to challenge allegedly lawless con-
duct, there will be others who possess it.79 Assuming some such alternative plaintiff
brings suit, the law may be enforced.80
But standing does not only operate to bar particular plaintiffs from litigating pu-
tative violations of federal law. In some areas of public concern, it operates to shield
violations from any remedy at all.81 These are not isolated cases. Often, a court’s
ruling that no one has standing to enforce a particular violation renders an entire
category of federal law unenforceable.82 Sometimes this is because, under the rele-
vant doctrine, literally no one has standing to sue.83 In other cases, it is possible to
imagine facts under which someone might have standing, but such plaintiffs will
74 See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998).
75 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
76 See id. at 560; Scalia, supra note 24, at 882 (“The requirement of standing has been
made part of American constitutional law through (for want of a better vehicle) the provision
of Art. III, Sec. 2, which states that ‘the judicial Power shall extend’ to certain ‘Cases’ and
‘Controversies.’”).
77 See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Congress’ role in
identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically
satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right
and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right. Article III standing re-
quires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”).
78 See generally, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.
79 See discussion supra Section I.A.1.
80 See, e.g., Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 200 (4th Cir. 2017)
(holding that a complaint alleging harm from government surveillance survives a facial
challenge to standing under Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013),
because the allegation of harm is not as speculative as it was in Clapper).
81 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (holding that in some
cases, no citizen will have standing to bring a constitutional claim and therefore relief may
be obtained in the judicial process).
82 See, e.g., Bickers, supra note 26, at 448–49.
83 See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 420–21 (acknowledging the possibility that no citizen may
have standing to challenge a particular federal law).
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either be rare or disinclined to litigate.84 Either way, standing doctrine works toward
ensuring that certain violations of federal law go without a judicial remedy.85
Establishment Clause case law is rich in examples of irremediable violations. In
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc.,86 the Supreme Court held that taxpayers had no standing to challenge the
federal government’s gift of land to a Christian college.87 Taxpayers sometimes have
standing to bring Establishment Clause challenges to federal expenditures made under
the Spending Clause, but the land transfer was made under the Property Clause.88 The
plaintiffs, the Court held, had no standing qua taxpayers to challenge the transfer under
the Property Clause.89 Their injury was therefore a mere “generalized grievance,”
shared equally by all.90 Such complaints cannot support a lawsuit in federal court.91
The Third Circuit wrote in its opinion below that the plaintiffs in Valley Forge
were “likely to be the best available.”92 “If they [did] not have standing,” the court
thought, “it [was] probable that . . . [i]n respect to such [property transfers], the
Establishment Clause would be rendered virtually unenforceable.”93 It is possible
to imagine the occasional individual uniquely affected by the government’s gift of
land—perhaps someone holds a contingent remainder defeated by the gift.94 But such
individuals are rare enough as to be negligible.95 As things stand, it is unlikely that
anyone can stop the government from giving gifts of property, no matter how pref-
erential, to a religious (or anti-religion) group.
Roughly the same goes for many monetary subsidies of religious groups. The
Supreme Court held in Flast v. Cohen96 that taxpayers have standing to mount
84 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 592–93 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(noting the burden the court has placed on future plaintiffs in meeting the “imminence” factor
of the Article III standing test).
85 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 493 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court “employ[s]
the rhetoric of ‘standing’ to deprive a person, whose interest is clearly protected by the law,
of the opportunity to prove that his own rights have been violated”).
86 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
87 See generally id.
88 Id. at 470.
89 Id. at 482.
90 Id. at 469 (noting that the district court held that respondents merely alleged a “gen-
eralized grievance” (citation omitted)).
91 See id. at 474–75.
92 Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, 619 F.2d 252, 268 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosenn, J., concurring), rev’d, Valley Forge, 454
U.S. 464.
93 Id.
94 As Judge Rosenn notes in Americans United for Separation of Church & State, it is
possible that the economic interests of one plaintiff may be sufficient to constitute standing
in an Establishment Clause action, but it would be very rare. Id.
95 See id.
96 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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Establishment Clause challenges to appropriations earmarked for religious groups.97
But it subsequently limited that decision in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Founda-
tion, Inc.98 There, it held that Flast does not apply to discretionary spending paid for
by general, religiously neutral, appropriations.99 Discretionary subsidies of religious
organizations affect the public in almost the same way as the gift of property in Valley
Forge.100 The injuries they might cause are just as generalized.101 Thus, as with Valley
Forge, no one is likely to be able to sue for redress of the kind of violation at issue
in Hein.
At least one federal circuit court has doubted whether anyone has standing to
challenge government speech either praising or disparaging religion. In Freedom
from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Obama,102 plaintiffs alleged that President Obama’s
address on the National Day of Prayer violated the Establishment Clause.103 The court
held that the feeling of being excluded or made unwelcome by government speech
failed to constitute a cognizable injury.104 “[H]urt feelings,” Judge Easterbrook wrote
for the court, “differ from legal injury.”105 The opinion went on to muse that, because
no one reasonably alters his behavior in response to mere speech, perhaps no one was
harmed more seriously than the plaintiffs.106 “If this means that no one has standing,”
the court wrote, “that does not change the outcome.”107
Standing doctrine might also operate to render putative violations of the Equal
Protection Clause unenforceable. If the government’s religious speech fails to gener-
ate a cognizable injury, so might its racial speech—even if overtly hostile. The Fifth
Circuit recently took that position in Moore v. Bryant.108 There, it held that when the
government uses racially insensitive or disparaging language, the “stigma” caused
by such speech “alone [is] insufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.”109
There is also probably no one with standing to enjoin violations of the Incom-
patibility Clause.110 That provision forbids anyone from simultaneously holding a
97 Id. at 105–06.
98 551 U.S. 587, 597–615 (2007) (plurality opinion).
99 Id. at 593.
100 See id. at 608–09.
101 Id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the harms alleged in Flast are no greater
than those alleged in Hein).
102 641 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2011).
103 Id. at 805.
104 See id. at 807.
105 Id. 
106 See id. at 808; see also Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1421 (7th Cir. 1991)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing that a de minimis change in behavior, such as looking away
from the offending speech, is not a cognizable injury), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1229 (1992).
107 Freedom from Religion Found., 641 F.3d at 808.
108 853 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 2017), cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 468 (2017).
109 Id. at 251–52.
110 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
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seat in the federal legislature and “holding any Office under the United States.”111
There is, at least, no standing qua citizen or taxpayer.112 And the Supreme Court has
acknowledged the possibility that, if citizens and taxpayers “have no standing to sue,
no one [has] standing.”113 The Court has said much the same about the Statement and
Account Clause, which requires the federal government to publicly report “Expen-
ditures of all public Money.”114 Taxpayers have no standing to enforce it.115 There,
too, the Court contemplated the likelihood that, if taxpayers are “not permitted to
litigate this issue, no one can do so.”116 It found the possibility acceptable, writing
that “the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately
to the political process.”117
Even where standing doctrine fails to render a violation of federal law completely
irremediable, it can often make enforcement substantially more difficult. This occurs
when the courts rule that the parties most interested in enforcement lack standing.118
Other plaintiffs with standing may exist, but they will be comparatively difficult to
find and unwilling to sue.119
In Warth v. Seldin,120 a coalition of plaintiffs brought suit to challenge the zoning
laws of Penfield, New York, which allegedly discriminated on the basis of income
and, by extension, race.121 The Court assumed that the zoning laws “had the purpose
and effect of excluding” poor minorities by keeping housing prices high.122 But, it
held that the low-income minority plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not
prove that an injunction against the laws would lower prices so that they could afford
housing.123 Nor did residents of Penfield have standing based on their desire to live
in an integrated community.124 Developers of low-income housing lacked standing
because they could not point to any project being held up by the regulations.125
111 Id.
112 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209–10 (1974)
(holding that a citizen’s claim under Incompatibility Clause did not constitute a concrete
injury).
113 Id. at 227.
114 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
115 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974).
116 Id. at 179.
117 Id.
118 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739–40 (1972) (noting that a special interest
in a subject was not sufficient to render an individual aggrieved or adversely affected, signifi-
cantly narrowing the pool of potential plaintiffs).
119 See id.
120 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
121 Id. at 495.
122 Id. at 502.
123 Id. at 503–04.
124 Id. at 512–13.
125 Id. at 516.
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After Warth, who is left to challenge discriminatory zoning laws? The set is not
null, but it is constrained. A developer who initiated a project but was blocked by
the regulations would likely have standing. But a developer reckless enough—or
committed enough to providing low-income housing—to commence a project it
knows to be doomed is a rare bird. Warth does not render the Equal Protection Clause
toothless as applied to zoning law.126 But it certainly makes litigation harder.
This is but a sampling of the cases where standing doctrine shields putative
violations of federal law from being challenged in court. Others likely exist.127 As
the standing problems in suits against Donald Trump demonstrate, violations of the
Emoluments Clause might be among them. If standing were no object, these provi-
sions of federal law could be given their full effect, rather than evading review on
procedural grounds.
B. State Standing
State courts are not bound by Article III,128 a feature of our federalism with two
implications. First is that plaintiffs who sue in state courts need not worry about the
strictures of federal standing doctrine.129 Indeed, many states have adopted a com-
paratively lax doctrine that permits citizens to sue for generalized grievances.130
Second is that there is heterogeneity in standing doctrine among the states—without
the anchor of Article III, states have been free to drift.131 This heterogeneity probably
reflects institutional differences—for example, whether a state’s judiciary is elected,
the terms of judges’ tenure, the text of state constitutions and ease of amendment.132
126 See id. at 522 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the purpose of the ordinance was
to prevent non-white citizens from living in the town).
127 Consider, for example, Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 927 (1997). It seems to imply that only those on the precipice of death at their doctors’
hands have standing to bring a constitutional challenge to Oregon’s assisted suicide law. If that
is right, potential plaintiffs are as likely to end up dead as they are parties to a federal lawsuit.
128 See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized
often that the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state
courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of
justiciability even when they address issues of federal law . . . .”).
129 See id.
130 For analysis of states’ standing doctrine, see two helpful notes: M. Ryan Harmanis,
Note, States’ Stances on Public Interest Standing, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 729 (2015); John
DiManno, Note, Beyond Taxpayers’ Suits: Public Interest Standing in the States, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 639 (2008).
131 See Harmanis, supra note 130, at app. 760–63.
132 For example, we might expect states with a more democratically accountable judiciary
to have a more relaxed standing doctrine. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the
“Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1886–88
(2001); DiManno, supra note 130, at 657–63.
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It may also reflect historical differences—for example, the traditional role of one
state’s judiciary in governing through the common law relative to another,133 or the
traditional prominence of a state’s judges relative to its legislators.134
The best way to explore state standing doctrines is through sampling.135 Below
we consider three states, each of which has embraced an approach that makes its
courts more hospitable to nontraditional plaintiffs than are the federal courts,136 and
each of which serves as an example of standing doctrine in other states.137
Michigan offers an instructive place to start because the Michigan Supreme
Court recently abandoned its faith in federal standing doctrine.138 The shift came in
Lansing Schools Educational Ass’n v. Lansing Board of Education.139 Plaintiffs
were four teachers and their unions.140 They sued in state court to force district offi-
cials to expel students who had allegedly assaulted the teachers.141 Michigan law then
required the expulsion of any student who assaulted a teacher,142 but district officials
had decided that suspensions would be appropriate.143 The district moved to dismiss
for lack of standing.144 They contended that the teachers were not injured by the
decision to suspend the students, and that any injury would not be redressable with
a favorable judgment because discretion is given to the findings of district officials
about whether there had been an assault.145
The Michigan Supreme Court rejected these arguments and endorsed an expan-
sive theory of standing.146 The court explained that “standing historically developed
in Michigan as a limited, prudential doctrine that was intended to ensure sincere and
133 See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780–1860 (1977) (explaining how some state judiciaries were once instrumental in gov-
erning society).
134 Cf. Hershkoff, supra note 132, at 1891–92.
135 For a fifty-state survey, see Harmanis, supra note 130, at app. 760–63.
136 Again, we use nontraditional in the non-Hohfeldian sense. See discussion supra notes
61, 63.
137 For example, standing doctrine in Utah closely resembles that in Ohio. Compare
Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098 (Utah 2013), with State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial
Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999). And standing doctrine in Wisconsin
closely resembles that in Michigan. Compare McConkey v. Van Hollen, 783 N.W.2d 855
(Wis. 2010), with Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686
(Mich. 2010). See also Harmanis, supra note 130, at app. 760–63.
138 See Lansing Schools, 792 N.W.2d at 695–96.
139 792 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 2010). Lansing Schools overruled Lee v. Macomb County
Board of Commissioners, 629 N.W.2d 900 (Mich. 2001), and later cases that had adopted
the requirements set out in Lujan.
140 Lansing Schools, 792 N.W.2d at 689.
141 See id.
142 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1311a(1) (2018).
143 See Lansing Schools, 792 N.W.2d at 689.
144 Id.
145 See id.
146 See id. at 688.
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vigorous advocacy by litigants.”147 Following that approach, “a [plaintiff] has stand-
ing whenever there is a legal cause of action.”148 And even when there is not obvi-
ously a legal cause of action, a plaintiff may have standing if he demonstrates “a
substantial interest [in the law’s enforcement] that is detrimentally affected in a man-
ner distinct from that of the general public.”149 The court concluded that the teachers
and unions fell into this latter category; their interest in the matter would promote
sufficient advocacy for the court to arrive at a sound decision.150 In other words, it
did not matter whether they suffered harm from the decision to suspend rather than
expel the students. It also did not matter whether they were in fact the ones who had
endured the alleged assaults.151 What mattered was that the legal issues would be
adequately developed by the individuals and organizations who sued.152
The New Jersey Supreme Court has recently explained the proudly relaxed
approach that it takes to standing:
Our liberal rules of standing are animated by a venerated princi-
ple: In the overall we have given due weight to the interests of
individual justice, along with the public interest, always bearing
in mind that throughout our law we have been sweepingly reject-
ing procedural frustrations in favor of just and expeditious deter-
minations on the ultimate merits. And that principle is premised
on a core concept of New Jersey jurisprudence, that is, that our
rules of procedure were not designed to create an injustice and
added complications but, on the contrary, were devised and pro-
mulgated for the purpose of promoting reasonable uniformity in
the expeditious and even administration of justice.153
To have standing to sue in New Jersey, then, a plaintiff must demonstrate only “a
sufficient stake and real adverseness with respect to the subject matter of the litiga-
tion.”154 The New Jersey Supreme Court has on occasion stated that a plaintiff must
demonstrate “a substantial likelihood of some harm . . . in the event of an unfavor-
able decision,”155 and at a glance this resembles the injury-in-fact and redressability
requirements of federal doctrine. Yet in the Mt. Laurel Cases,156 the New Jersey
147 Id. at 692 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148 Id. at 699.
149 Id. at 702.
150 See id. at 699–702.
151 See id. at 701 (“[T]eachers who work in a public school have a significant interest dis-
tinct from that of the general public in the enforcement of MCL 380.1311a(1).”).
152 See id.
153 Jen Elec., Inc. v. County of Essex, 964 A.2d 790, 801–02 (N.J. 2009) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
154 Id. at 801 (citation omitted).
155 Id. at 802 (citation omitted).
156 S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975)
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Supreme Court held that an organization had standing to challenge exclusionary
zoning practices because the organization “ha[d] the objective of” ending such
practices.157 This is a near-circular approach that seems to throw open the doors of
state courthouses to motivated plaintiffs.
Ohio courts recite standing requirements that mirror the federal triad,158 but the
Ohio Supreme Court has long recognized an exception “when the issues sought to
be litigated are of great importance and interest to the public.”159 This so-called
“public-right doctrine” is invoked by plaintiffs who sue to compel government offi-
cials to act in compliance with state and federal law, but who cannot show any unique
harm from the officials’ alleged wrongdoing.160 In State ex rel. Newell v. Brown,161
for example, the plaintiff sought to forbid a state official from printing and distribut-
ing ballots that listed particular candidates for judgeships.162 The plaintiff contended
that these candidates were nominated pursuant to an unconstitutional statutory scheme,
but he sued only “as a citizen, taxpayer and elector” who was “interested in the execu-
tion of the laws.”163 The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff had stand-
ing to sue.164 The court reasoned that “as a matter of public policy, a citizen of a
community does have such an interest in his government as to give him capacity to
maintain a proper action to enforce the performance of a public duty affecting him-
self as a citizen and citizens generally.”165 In its most recent decisions on standing,
the Ohio Supreme Court has cautioned that the public-right doctrine applies only in
“rare cases” that present “exceptional circumstances,”166 yet the court continues to
rely on the doctrine to permit plaintiffs to sue for generalized grievances.167
(Mt. Laurel I); S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J.
1983) (Mt. Laurel II).
157 Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 483 (“[W]e hold that . . . any organization that has the
objective of[ ] securing lower income housing opportunities in a municipality will have
standing to sue . . . .”).
158 See, e.g., Moore v. City of Middletown, 975 N.E.2d 977, 982 (Ohio 2012).
159 State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1082 (Ohio
1999).
160 The Ohio Supreme Court has clarified that the doctrine applies only in original actions
for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. See ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 13 N.E.3d
1101, 1105 (Ohio 2014).
161 122 N.E.2d 105 (Ohio 1954).
162 See id. at 106.
163 Id. at 106–07 (citation omitted).
164 See id. at 107.
165 Id.
166 State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Comp., 780 N.E.2d 981, 985
(Ohio 2002) (citation omitted).
167 See, e.g., id. (“We find this case to be one of those rare cases.”); State ex rel. Ohio
Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1084 (Ohio 1999) (“[T]here can be
no doubt that the issues sought to be litigated in this case are of such a high order of public
concern as to justify allowing this action as a public action.”).
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C. The Standing Gap and Its Consequences
Now we can see a clear gap between federal and state standing requirements.
Federal standing requirements are strict.168 They erect a barrier to adjudication for
litigants who cannot demonstrate injury, traceability, and redressability.169 But many
states take the opposite approach, employing flexible heuristics when deciding who
can sue in their courts.170 What difference does this distinction make?
The states discussed above can be sorted into three rough categories. First, some
states have effectively no standing requirement at all.171 New Jersey fits best into this
category.172 Its courts nominally require “a sufficient stake and real adverseness” to
bring suit.173 But if those requirements are met by any plaintiff who “has the objec-
tive of” winning his lawsuit, it is hard to see how standing requirements ever present
an obstacle to litigation in New Jersey.174 States like Michigan add the minimal cri-
terion of sufficient adversity.175 These states do not require anything like a “concrete
and particularized injury” to bring suit.176 But they do bar plaintiffs who cannot be
expected to adequately develop and argue the relevant legal issues.177 A plaintiff who
could demonstrate neither an injury nor a longstanding interest in a case’s subject
matter might have difficulty suing in these states.178 Finally, states like Ohio add a
public-interest requirement.179 We question whether Ohio in particular takes this re-
quirement seriously. But even lax enforcement of a public interest requirement might
prevent some plaintiffs without federal standing from suing states like these.
II. USING THE STANDING GAP TO ENFORCE FEDERAL LAW
A. Bridging the Gap: Enforcing Federal Law in Federal Court Without
Article III Standing
Now we are ready to lay out the details of our method for enforcing federal law
in federal court without Article III standing. The gist is this: plaintiffs can initiate
168 See Rooney et al., supra note 31.
169 See id.
170 See, e.g., id.
171 See supra notes 153–57 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 153–57 and accompanying text.
173 Jen Elec., Inc. v. County of Essex, 964 A.2d 790, 801 (N.J. 2009) (citation omitted).
174 Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390, 483 (N.J. 1983).
175 See supra notes 138–52 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 64–67.
177 See, e.g., supra notes 146–48.
178 While the court in Lansing Schools held that a plaintiff may still have standing when
legal action was not obvious, the plaintiff needed a substantial interest that was unique from
the general public. 792 N.W.2d 686, 702 (Mich. 2010).
179 See supra notes 158–67 and accompanying text.
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suits in state courts with lax standing requirements. U.S. Supreme Court precedent
then works as a bridge to federal review. We continue to use CREW’s Emoluments
Clause suit against Trump as an example. Any plaintiff worried that he lacks stand-
ing to sue in federal court could follow the same path.
1. Step One: Winning in State Court
We suppose for purposes of this example that CREW lacks standing to sue
under the Emoluments Clause in federal court. A federal district court has already
reached this conclusion,180 and so we really only suppose that this judgment would
be affirmed if appealed. CREW should therefore start fresh in some state court where
standing will not be a hurdle. Where? As discussed in Section I.C, even among
states with relaxed standing requirements there is variance in who can sue under what
law. CREW should face no obstacle to litigation in any of the states we described
above. It could sue in a state like New Jersey, which has functionally no standing
requirement.181 It could also sue in a state like Michigan, since there is reason to think
that CREW—an organization dedicated to policing government ethics—will ade-
quately develop and argue the Emoluments Clause question.182 Nor should CREW
have difficulty suing in a state with a public-interest requirement, such as Ohio.183
CREW has options, so it should file suit wherever it feels most confident it can
win. As we will discuss below, winning in state court is essential to obtaining federal
review. New Jersey may be a promising venue. It is probably the most politically
liberal of the lax-standing states discussed above,184 and CREW might expect the
state’s judiciary to reflect its population. Or if some other state’s judiciary has taken
a hard line against corruption, CREW might be inclined to sue there.
Imagine that the CREW suit is now filed in New Jersey state court. What next?
One might expect Trump to swiftly remove the case. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a civil
action brought in state court may be removed by the defendant to a federal district
court with “original jurisdiction” over it.185 Assume Trump removed the CREW law-
suit under § 1441 to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. As
180 See generally Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 1:17-
cv-00458-GBD (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2017).
181 See Rooney et al., supra note 31.
182 See discussion supra Section I.B.
183 See discussion supra Section I.B.
184 See, e.g., Frank Newport, Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana Most Conservative States,
GALLUP (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/181505/mississippi-alabama-louisiana-con
servative-states.aspx?utm_source=Politics&utm_medium=newsfeed&utm_campaign=tiles.
185 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the de-
fendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending.”).
2018] THE FEDERAL–STATE STANDING GAP 1175
above, we assume that CREW cannot meet the requirements for Article III standing
in federal court. Standing is a jurisdictional requirement in federal court, so the dis-
trict court lacks original jurisdiction.186 By § 1441’s terms, removal is improper, and
the case must remain in state court.187 CREW’s very obstacle to federal adjudication
on the merits is thus its anchor allowing for state-court review.
Much more likely, though, is that Trump invokes 28 U.S.C. § 1442, which au-
thorizes removal of any suit “against . . . any officer . . . of the United States or of
any agency thereof . . . for or relating to any act under color of such office.”188
Unlike § 1441, the text in § 1442 does not make jurisdiction in the district court a pre-
requisite for removal.189 The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1442’s removal right
broadly—going so far as to characterize it as “absolute”190—to ensure that federal
officers have a federal forum in which to assert immunity from state law under the
Supremacy Clause.191 This has led some to suggest that a district court should dis-
miss a no-standing suit removed under § 1442.192 If CREW’s case were removed and
dismissed, it would trigger a Sisyphean cycle. Dismissals for lack of jurisdiction are
without prejudice,193 so CREW could refile in state court. But Trump would remove
again, the suit would be dismissed again . . . and the litigation would die.194
Happily for CREW, the removal statutes suggest a different outcome. Congress
has made clear that a remand to state court, not dismissal, is the appropriate disposi-
tion of any no-standing case removed to federal court.195 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c),
“[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”196 Standing is a jurisdictional require-
ment, so a lack of standing triggers § 1447(c)’s remand provision.197 The statute ap-
plies on its face to all removals, making no distinction between § 1441 and § 1442.198
The Supreme Court agrees. In International Primate Protection League v. Ad-
ministrators of Tulane Educational Fund,199 a federal agency removed a suit about
186 See discussion supra Section I.A. Of course, federal courts have jurisdiction to determine
if jurisdiction exists in any given case. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803).
187 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012) (requiring district courts to remand any previously
removed case over which the court determines it lacks jurisdiction).
188 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2012).
189 See id.
190 Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 (1981).
191 See id. at 241–42, 241 n.16.
192 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement
of Federal Environmental Law by Non–Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003, 1040 (2001).
193 See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
194 See 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2012).
195 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012).
196 Id.
197 See id.
198 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–1442 (2012).
199 500 U.S. 72 (1991).
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custody of monkeys used for medical research under § 1442(a)(1).200 The Court held
that § 1442(a)(1) does not authorize federal agencies to remove and that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.201 The Court explained its holding with re-
spect to the district court’s jurisdiction in a cryptic footnote that seemed to adopt the
Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that plaintiffs “lack[ed] [Article III] standing to protect the
monkeys.”202 The Court then remanded the action to state court under § 1447(c), over-
turning the Fifth Circuit’s decision to dismiss.203 According to the Court, § 1447(c)
supplies “no discretion to dismiss rather than remand an action” over which the dis-
trict court lacks jurisdiction.204
The structure of § 1447 also points toward § 1447(c)’s applicability in § 1442
removals.205 Section 1447(d) makes orders to remand non-appealable, except in cases
removed under § 1442.206 The Supreme Court has held that § 1447(d)’s bar on ap-
pealability applies only to orders to remand under § 1447(c).207 If § 1447(c) were in-
applicable to § 1442 removals, then no orders to remand would fall under § 1447(d)’s
exception to non-appealability.208 The exception would be superfluous. Only if §
1447(c) applies to cases removed under § 1442 do all parts of § 1447(d) have effect.209
Such remands under § 1447(c) create no conflict with the Supreme Court’s in-
sistence on a broad—perhaps “absolute”210—right of removal under § 1442.211 At
least they do not in the cases we care about. Federal officers’ right of removal is sup-
posed to give them a federal forum in which to mount a defense of federal law pre-
empting state law.212 But this Article is not about enforcing state law against anyone.
It is about enforcing federal law without Article III standing. So the preemption de-
fense simply does not arise. The rationale for a broad right of removal therefore does
200 See id. at 89.
201 See id. at 87.
202 Id. at 78 n.4. As we say, footnote four is cryptic. An alternative reading of it is that the
district court lacked jurisdiction because there was no statutory grant of jurisdiction. That is true
because plaintiffs sued under state law and the Court had just concluded that § 1442(a)(1)
does not apply. Id. In any event, Primate Protection is instructive because the Court ordered
a remand rather than a dismissal based on the text of § 1447(c) and a conclusion that the
district court lacked jurisdiction. See id. Why the district court lacked jurisdiction—no
standing or no statutory grant—is less important.
203 See id. at 87.
204 Id. at 89 (quoting Me. Ass’n of Indep. Neighborhoods v. Comm’r, Me. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 876 F.2d 1051, 1054 (1st Cir. 1989)).
205 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2012).
206 See id. § 1447(d).
207 See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 243 (2007).
208 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
209 See id.
210 Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 (1981).
211 See id.
212 See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136–39 (1989).
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not favor dismissal in the CREW case or any other case under federal law. Trump
cannot scuttle CREW’s lawsuit in state court through removal under § 1442. The state-
court litigation proceeds.213
But staying in state court is not enough; CREW needs to win. As we will discuss
below, federal review of federal claims is available to plaintiffs without standing only
if they win in state court.214 CREW’s goal here is to obtain a judgment in its favor
either from the Supreme Court of New Jersey or from the New Jersey Appellate
Division with the Supreme Court of New Jersey then denying review. Either out-
come allows the defendant—Trump in our example—to petition the U.S. Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari.215
There is little more to say if CREW immediately wins in the New Jersey trial and
appellate courts—at least for now. But what if CREW loses? Suppose it wins at trial
and on appeal, but the Supreme Court of New Jersey ultimately rules against it. Is
the journey toward federal review over? Happily for CREW, the story does not end
here. As discussed above, there are many states with lax standing requirements.216
So CREW can try again in another state’s system, perhaps in Michigan or Ohio.
One might object here that rules of claim and issue preclusion, along with the
Full Faith and Credit Clause,217 prevent CREW from relitigating the claim it has just
lost. That would be right if CREW were to refile under its own name in another
state.218 But it does not need to do that. It can recruit any of the numerous other plain-
tiffs likely to have standing in a state court with lax requirements.219 For some states,
anyone will do. Once CREW locates a plaintiff, claim and issue preclusion cease to
apply because both require some identity of litigants.220 For claim preclusion to apply,
both litigants must be identical to—or in privity with—those in the original litigation.221
CREW’s new plaintiff will be neither. Issue preclusion merely requires that the party
against whom preclusion is asserted have been a party to the original litigation.222
CREW’s new plaintiff, as a non-party to the original suit, will be immune.223
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, as relevant here, requires a state to give only
as much preclusive effect to the judgment of a sister state as would the state that
213 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447.
214 See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
215 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012).
216 See discussion supra Section I.B.
217 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
218 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
219 See generally DiManno, supra note 130; Harmanis, supra note 130.
220 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24.
221 See id.
222 Id. §§ 27, 29.
223 A court might consider CREW to have had a “sufficient ‘laboring oar’” in the first
litigation to be treated as a party for purposes of preclusion. Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 155 (1979) (quoting Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. 316, 318 (1945)).
1178 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:1155
rendered it.224 Because neither claim nor issue preclusion would apply in New Jersey
against CREW’s new plaintiff, they need not apply in other states.225 Moreover, no
state judiciary is required to acquiesce to the legal reasoning of its sister states;
where one state court finds no Emoluments Clause violation, another state court may
find a flagrant one.226
Assume CREW eventually convinces a state’s highest court to rule in its favor.
President Trump could give up here. More likely, he will petition the U.S. Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari. Given the magnitude of this hypothetical case, the
Supreme Court is almost certain to grant certiorari.
2. Step Two: Reaching the Supreme Court via ASARCO
What happens once the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari in our illustrative
case? As we emphasized above, Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement is a
limit on the adjudicatory power of all federal courts.227 That includes the Supreme
Court. One might therefore expect the Supreme Court to dismiss the CREW suit for
lack of standing. If it did so, the state court judgment would stand, rendering a state
court the final arbiter of the federal constitutional provision.228
But the Supreme Court, under current law, need not dismiss CREW’s suit for lack
of jurisdiction.229 The precedent is clear on this point. In ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, the
Court firmly established its ability to review such cases.230 In doing so, the Justices—
intentionally or not—created a mechanism for litigants who lack Article III standing
to nevertheless enforce federal laws in the highest federal court.231
In ASARCO, a group of taxpayers and teachers in Arizona sought to challenge
the state’s mineral-lease scheme under a federal statute and the state constitution.232
The substance of their challenge is unimportant. Two things do matter. First, these
plaintiffs did not have Article III standing to sue in federal court.233 Second, although
not intentionally trying to avoid the standing requirement, the ASARCO plaintiffs
224 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the pub-
lic Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.”); see also Riley v. N.Y. Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942).
225 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24.
226 Barbara Bintliff, Mandatory v. Persuasive Cases, 9 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. &
WRITING 83, 84–85 (2001).
227 See discussion supra Section I.A.
228 See discussion infra Sections IV.B–C.
229 See generally ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989) (holding that the Supreme
Court may exercise jurisdiction on appeal from a state court even if the plaintiffs would not
have had standing to bring suit in federal court).
230 See id. at 624.
231 See generally id.
232 See id. at 610.
233 See id. at 618.
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followed the pattern we have laid out so far.234 They filed their case in state court
and won a judgment from the Supreme Court of Arizona.235
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it could review the judgment in a fractured
opinion.236 Justice Kennedy, joined by three others, found that the plaintiffs would
have lacked standing had they originally filed in federal court.237 Justice Brennan, also
joined by three others, declined to decide the question.238 What six Justices agreed
upon was that it did not matter whether the plaintiffs had Article III standing.239 The
Supreme Court could review the case either way.240
Turning the traditional standing inquiry on its head, the Court held that it was
sufficient to satisfy the strictures of Article III that the defendants, rather than the
plaintiffs, had standing.241 This was because “the defendants in the case and the
losing parties below . . . br[ought] the case [to the Supreme Court] and thus [sought]
entry to the federal courts for the first time.”242 Under ASARCO, the party who needs
standing is ostensibly the party who first invokes the power of the federal courts.243
Once the Court determined that the defendants’ standing would be sufficient to
satisfy Article III, it turned to the question of whether the defendants had standing.244
As described above, standing requires an injury-in-fact, traceability, and redress-
ability.245 One might wonder how the defendants could demonstrate an injury. There
were no counterclaims by which they might have alleged harm.
Instead of looking outside of the litigation to see whether the defendants in
ASARCO had suffered an injury, the Court looked within it.246 It held that the state-
court judgment against the defendant, issued in the very litigation under review,
constituted an injury for purposes of Article III.247 The Court held that “as a result of
the state-court judgment, the case has taken on such definite shape that [the defen-
dants] are under a defined and specific legal obligation, one which causes them direct
injury.”248 Such an injury—if it is indeed a proper injury for purposes of the standing
inquiry249—is obviously traceable and redressable. As the Court wrote, “our reversal
of the decision below would remove its disabling effects upon [defendants]. In these
234 See id. at 610.
235 See id.
236 See generally id.
237 See id. at 616–17 (plurality opinion).
238 See id. at 633–34 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
239 See id at 617–24 (majority opinion).
240 See generally id.
241 See id. at 618.
242 Id.
243 See id.
244 See id. at 618–19.
245 See discussion infra Section I.A.
246 See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 617–18.
247 See id. at 618.
248 Id.
249 See discussion infra Section IV.A.
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circumstances, we conclude that [defendants] meet each prong of the constitutional
standing requirements.”250 The Court went on to review the case on the merits, ruling
in favor of the plaintiffs.251
Here we finally have it—federal review of a federal claim without the plaintiffs
ever having to demonstrate Article III standing. Under the plainest reading of the
ASARCO opinion, no plaintiff ever needs standing to litigate the merits of a federal
claim in the U.S. Supreme Court.252 Anyone can file suit in a state court with lax
standing requirements.253 If the plaintiff wins, the Supreme Court can take the case,254
Article III be damned. This applies to CREW and the Emoluments Clause. But it
also applies to other plaintiffs concerned about constitutional and statutory viola-
tions commonly thought difficult to enforce.255 Article III’s standing requirement is
diminished as a barrier to federal review.
We pause for a moment to make two notes. First, it should now be clear why
winning in state court is essential for parties seeking no-standing, federal-court en-
forcement of federal laws. The injury providing ASARCO’s defendants standing was
the state-court judgment against them.256 In the absence of such a judgment, there
is no injury, no defendant with standing, and no power for the Supreme Court to
consider the case on its merits.257 A state-court judgment against the plaintiffs would
not be sufficient.258 In that case, the plaintiffs, not the defendants, would be the parties
“seek[ing] entry to the federal courts for the first time in the lawsuit.”259 Then, the
plaintiffs’ standing, not the defendants’, would be at issue.260 A state-court judgment
against the plaintiffs would merely deny them relief.261 It would not impose a “defined
and specific legal obligation” sufficient to constitute an injury under ASARCO.262
Thus, only victorious plaintiffs may obtain Supreme Court review under ASARCO,
an oddity that the ASARCO Court itself acknowledged.263
Second, we emphasize again that, although the ASARCO Court may well have
failed to anticipate the consequences of its decision, it is nevertheless the law. The
250 ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 618–19.
251 See id. at 633.
252 See id.
253 See generally DiManno, supra note 130; Harmanis, supra note 130.
254 Of course, the Supreme Court agrees to decide only about 1% of cases it is asked to
decide each year. See Frequently Asked Questions: General Information, SUP. CT. OF THE
U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/faq_general.aspx [https://perma.cc/R3CY-QZ4S]
(last visited Apr. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
255 See discussion supra Section I.A.2.
256 ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 618.
257 See id.
258 See id.
259 Id.
260 See id.
261 See id.
262 Id.
263 See id. at 624.
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opinions in ASARCO do not evince that the plaintiffs there were working strategically
to avoid Article III’s strictures.264 The Court therefore may have overlooked the fact
that its holding would bridge the Federal–State Standing Gap, providing the possibility
of federal review to plaintiffs without Article III standing. Indeed, everyone seems
to have overlooked it. Since its issuance, ASARCO has never been cited by the U.S.
Supreme Court to justify review of a case in which the plaintiffs lacked Article III
standing.265 Nor is there any case revealing even a hint of plaintiff’s strategic avoid-
ance of the standing requirement.266 The Supreme Court did not appear to anticipate
that, post-ASARCO, plaintiffs could do what we’ve described.
Here is where the law stands. Because of the Federal–State Standing Gap, almost
any plaintiff can sue to enforce almost any federal law. Article III is no impediment.
And if a plaintiff wins in state court, it has an opportunity to litigate on the merits
in the U.S. Supreme Court. This diminishes Article III as a barrier to litigation in fed-
eral court. But it potentially empowers litigants like CREW that wish to enforce provi-
sions of federal law previously regarded as unenforceable in federal court. Plaintiffs
do not seem to have caught on to this yet. Case in point: the debate around the CREW
litigation is about whether Article III standing is present, not whether it is necessary.267
But once plaintiffs come to appreciate ASARCO and the standing gap, the methods
by which federal law is enforced may change permanently.
B. Shooting the Gap268: Terminal State Court Review As an Attractive Alternative
to Federal Court
CREW’s case is incendiary. They accuse the President of violating the Constitution
and seek an injunction barring him from retaining ownership in his multibillion-dollar
264 See generally id.
265 In Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam), the Court dismissed as
improvidently granted a petition that had cited ASARCO to justify certiorari notwithstanding
doubts about plaintiffs’ standing. In opinions accompanying the DIG, some of the Justices
debated whether ASARCO should extend to cases in which the state court had not yet entered
judgment against the defendant. Id. at 661–64 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 670 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). In Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 120 (2003), the Justices recognized
Virginia’s standing under ASARCO in lieu of deciding whether a defendant had standing to
mount a facial challenge to a criminal statute.
266 States enforce their criminal laws in their own courts, so there is no possibility that
Virginia brought the state-law prosecution in Hicks to avoid Article III’s strictures.
267 See Hessick, supra note 13.
268 “Shooting the gap” is a phrase used to describe a football player who aggressively de-
fends by exploiting space between the opposing team’s linemen. See, e.g., Gregg Easterbrook,
The All-Unwanted All-Pros, Conference Championship Analysis, and More, ESPN (Jan. 24,
2008, 4:44 PM), http://www.espn.com/espn/page2/story?page=easterbrook/080122 [https://
perma.cc/3FUX-9NNV] (“New England linebacker Junior Seau . . . shot the gap behind the
play and tackled the runner for a loss . . . .”). If one finds football analogies helpful, consider
the tactic discussed supra Section II.A as an “end run” around jurisdictional rules. Cf. Burris 
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business.269 If they were to follow our method, refile in a state court with lax standing
requirements, and win, the Supreme Court would almost certainly grant certiorari.
They would thus be able to enforce federal law in federal court without Article III
standing. Other impact litigators bringing similarly high-profile cases might have
a good chance of doing the same. But what about litigants without standing who
wish to bring less significant federal-law cases? Given the small percentage of cases
in which the Supreme Court grants certiorari,270 they are unlikely to achieve what
ASARCO makes possible. Does our method leave them in the lurch?
The Federal–State Standing Gap still gives such plaintiffs what they seek. Lax
state standing rules create a gap in Article III’s defense against private enforcement
of federal law through which litigants can break. Filing in a state court and failing
to obtain Supreme Court review is, we argue, almost as good as filing in federal
court and achieving the same outcome.
Nearly any federal claim that plaintiffs might want to bring in federal court can
be brought in state court.271 Most state courts have general jurisdiction.272 They can
hear any state-law claim and nearly any federal-law claim.273 The only exception is for
federal claims in areas where Congress has provided for exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion.274 Bankruptcy, antitrust, patent, and copyright cases are the notable examples.275
Plaintiffs can also obtain suitable remedies from a state court. As discussed below,
state courts can award declaratory relief and damages to the same extent as federal
courts.276 And while some have thought otherwise, we argue below that state courts
have equitable power commensurate with that of the federal courts. This includes
the power to issue national injunctions binding federal officials.277
Finally, just as would be the case if plaintiffs sued in a lower federal court but
failed to obtain Supreme Court review, state-court litigation produces binding prec-
edent.278 True, a decision from a federal court of appeals binds federal courts in
v. Parke, 130 F.3d 782, 784 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he Rule 60(b) motion may be designed as
an end run around the appellate court’s gatekeeping function . . . .”), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
990 (1997).
269 See Zarroli, supra note 6.
270 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 254.
271 See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 739 (2009) (discussing general jurisdiction in
state court).
272 See, e.g., id.; McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233–34 (1934).
273 See, e.g., Haywood, 556 U.S. at 739.
274 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012).
275 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 1337, 1338 (2012) (bankruptcy, antitrust, and patent and copyright,
respectively).
276 See discussion infra Section III.A.
277 See discussion infra Section III.A.
278 John M. Walker, Jr., The Role of Precedent in the United States: How Do Precedents
Lose Their Binding Effect?, STAN. L. SCH.: CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT (Feb. 29, 2016),
http://cgc.law.stanford.edu/commentaries/15-John-Walker [https://perma.cc/NC2W-WTBB].
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several states, while a state appellate court binds only the state’s judiciary.279 But that
does not render state-court decisions less important than federal-court decisions.280
A decision of the Supreme Court of California binds more people than the population
within the Tenth Circuit.281
III. WHY ISN’T EVERYONE DOING THIS ALREADY?
The preceding discussion demonstrates how the Federal–State Standing Gap,
along with ASARCO, makes it possible for plaintiffs without Article III standing to
enforce federal law in federal court. And even plaintiffs who use our method but fail
to obtain Supreme Court review have access to state-court adjudication on a par with
that of the federal courts. The upshot is that Article III standing is essentially never
an impediment to any plaintiff wishing to enforce federal law. We expect this result
to surprise many. But more surprising, we think, is that nobody seems to be wielding
the precedent to their advantage. Part III reflects on why that might be the case.
We start from the premise that litigators are rational actors and first consider
whether inadequate remedies or onerous procedures drive plaintiffs away from state
court. We then relax the assumption of rationality and suggest a more provocative
explanation.
A. Are State-Court Remedies Inadequate?
Again, we start from the premise that litigators are rational. Whether their goal
in any case is to secure damages, test the constitutionality of state action, or reshape
policy, what they need is a judgment on the merits. There ought to be a good reason,
then, that the Federal–State Standing Gap is not exploited to elude a dismissal for lack
of standing in federal court.
The simplest explanation for litigators’ aversion to state court could be that state-
court remedies are inadequate. It would be senseless to litigate in a forum that could
not award the relief you desire. Even constitutional lawsuits are not entirely aca-
demic affairs.
As a general rule, federal courts are empowered to award damages, declaratory re-
lief, and injunctive relief to those with a right of action.282 Declaratory and injunctive
279 See id.
280 See id.
281 See City and Town Population Totals: 2010–2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/total-cities-and-towns.html [https://perma
.cc/FT4Y-N4VJ] (last updated Dec. 5, 2017) (compare California’s total population from the
cities and towns spreadsheet with the total populations of Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming).
282 Congress may limit remedies for certain claims. See, e.g., Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 1664, 1674–75 (2017). And modern Supreme Court decisions express a reluctance
to imply private rights of action. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017).
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relief is generally available against federal officials.283 The power to award damages
and injunctions is likely inherent in Article III’s investiture of the “judicial power”
in the Supreme Court and inferior courts,284 at least in cases for which the court has
subject-matter jurisdiction.285 The power to award declaratory relief is statutorily con-
ferred and of comparatively recent vintage.286 Federal courts also have the authority
and obligation to calibrate each form of relief so that it is complete but not more.287
How do state-court remedies compare?
1. Damages
State courts can issue damages judgments for federal claims to at least the same
extent as federal courts, including against federal officials.288 The Supreme Court rec-
ognized state courts’ authority to award damages against federal officials as early as
1851.289 Plaintiffs suing federal officials in state court have to wrangle with sovereign
and official immunities, but that is true in federal court as well.290 And no matter the
forum, plaintiffs avoid sovereign immunity when they seek compensation from a fed-
eral officer in his individual capacity.291 Some may assume that the Westfall Act is
an insuperable obstacle to suing federal officials for damages in state court. But that
statute preempts certain suits against federal officials under state law,292 and this is
283 Federal courts may order prospective relief against state officials so as to bar those
officials from violating federal law. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974);
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
284 See, e.g., In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599 (1895) (stating that the power to enjoin is
“recognized from ancient times and by indubitable authority”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal
right, there is also a legal remedy . . . .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
285 See William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1809–10 (2008).
286 Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02 (2012)).
287 See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (“[R]elief should be no more
burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”).
The corollary to this proposition is that a suit becomes moot, and so a federal court loses
jurisdiction, when relief would be ineffectual. See, e.g., Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136
S. Ct. 663, 669–71 (2016).
288 See, e.g., Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1851) (holding that state courts have
jurisdiction in actions for trover against federal officials).
289 See generally id.
290 See Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the
Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 509, 535 (2013) (“The status of official
immunity as federal or state law was unclear in the pre-Erie period. Today, the immunity is
understood to have the status of federal common law, protecting federal officers whether
sued under Bivens or state common law.”).
291 See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1291–92 (2017).
292 See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall
Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 6, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564–65 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)).
The Westfall Act permits the Attorney General to certify that a federal employee acted within
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an Article about how to enforce federal law. Moreover, the Westfall Act excepts from
its coverage suits “brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States.”293
It is even possible that state courts have more power than federal courts to rec-
ognize a right of action for damages against federal officials who allegedly violate
the Constitution. To understand this counterintuitive proposition, recall that damages
are available only if the relevant law provides a private right of action.294 In Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,295 the Supreme Court
created a private right of action to recover damages from federal officials who vio-
late the Fourth Amendment.296 The Court reasoned that “[t]he very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”297 While such language might have been
read to indicate that there is a private right of action for damages whenever any con-
stitutional right is violated, the law has not evolved that way.298 Instead, the Court
has cabined its holding in Bivens, refusing to create a damages action for most other
violations.299 Yet it is not at all clear that state courts must be so stingy.300
In Ziglar v. Abbasi,301 the Court set out its own reasons for cabining Bivens.302
It wrote that the primary question in determining whether a private right of action
exists is “who should decide.”303 “The answer most often will be Congress,” because
Congress is in the best position to decide whether, on balance, a damages right best
balances private and government interests.304 While courts generally have the power
to create rights of action, they should “hesitate” to do so in deference to Congress’s
expertise.305 And “if there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the effi-
cacy or necessity of a damages remedy . . . the courts must refrain from creating the
remedy in order to respect the role of Congress in determining the nature and extent
of federal-court jurisdiction under Article III.”306
the scope of his employment in allegedly committing a state-law tort. Certification yields
removal of the case to federal court, substitution of the federal government as defendant, and
conversion of the suit from a state-law tort to one under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id.
293 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2012).
294 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283–84 (1998).
295 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
296 See id. at 397.
297 Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
298 See generally Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
299 See id. at 1857.
300 See generally id. at 1858 (discussing alternative remedial structures, including recog-
nizing state tort law providing alternative means for relief).
301 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
302 See id. at 1857.
303 Id. (citation omitted).
304 Id. at 1857–58.
305 Id. at 1858.
306 Id. (emphasis added).
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According to Ziglar, there are prudential reasons to cabin Bivens, but the only thing
that prevents the judicial recognition of rights of action for damages is Article III.307
Article III, of course, does not apply to state courts.308 While Congress may place
some questions of federal law in the exclusive hands of federal courts,309 it does not
have plenary power over state-court jurisdiction.310 State courts therefore need not
worry about stepping on congressional power when deciding which remedies they
make available to litigants before them.
One might also argue that the Supreme Court’s refusal to extend Bivens amounts
to procedural federal law applicable in federal, but not state, court. If that were right,
even if Ziglar rested on more than just Article III, its holding would be inapplicable
to state courts. Under the Supremacy Clause, state courts must faithfully apply sub-
stantive federal law—including federal common law.311 But states are generally free
to create their own procedural rules.312 Indeed, much state-court procedure differs
from that of the federal courts.313 This arrangement is reminiscent of the Erie doc-
trine,314 under which federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive but not
procedural law.315
If the cases restricting Bivens are procedural, perhaps state courts need not abide
by them. The question of whether cases creating—or declining to create—a remedy
are substantive or procedural is knotty. Like Bivens, the Declaratory Judgment Act
authorizes a remedy—namely the declaratory judgment.316 The Supreme Court has
characterized the Declaratory Judgment Act as “only procedural . . . leaving substan-
tive rights unchanged.”317 It makes sense to view Bivens the same way. But, by con-
trast, the Supreme Court treats punitive damages caps and statutes of limitation as
substantive for purposes of the Erie doctrine.318 And both of those rules, like Bivens,
307 See id. at 1857.
308 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often
that the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts
are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability
even when they address issues of federal law . . . .”).
309 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 1337, 1338 (2012) (bankruptcy, antitrust, and patent and
copyright, respectively).
310 See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 617.
311 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988); Local 174,
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95,
102 (1962).
312 See Felder, 487 U.S. at 150–51.
313 See discussion infra Section III.B.
314 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
315 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
316 See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012) (“Any such declaration shall have the force and effect
of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.”).
317 Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 849 (2014) (cita-
tions and internal quotation marks omitted).
318 See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996); Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750–52 (1980).
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regulate how and how much litigants can recover in court.319 The precedent points in
multiple directions.
Perhaps this uncertainty could be resolved by noting the different rationales at
issue when federal courts wish to apply their own procedure and when state courts
wish to apply theirs. The former situation is regulated by Erie, which aims to reduce
forum shopping and promote the equitable administration of laws.320 The Erie doc-
trine also takes account of strong governmental interests, whether state or federal.321
The substance/procedure distinction under Erie is therefore shaped by such consid-
erations. By contrast, states’ freedom to design their own procedural rules is regu-
lated by the Supremacy Clause.322 It is subject to the constraint that such rules not
impede the vindication of federal rights.323 So maybe Erie cases are inapposite in
determining whether the states must follow the Supreme Court in limiting Bivens.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that, by their procedures, “[s]tates may make the
litigation of federal rights as congenial as they see fit.”324 The expansion of Bivens
would not undermine federal rights; it would encourage their vindication.325 This,
combined with the fact that the creation of a remedy regulates courts’—not ordinary
citizens’—conduct, suggests that a state court’s expansion of Bivens might best be
categorized as a legitimate procedural move.326
Whatever the appeal of the forgoing arguments, we think it unlikely that the
Supreme Court would uphold a state court’s decision to read Bivens liberally. The
Court would likely have important policy considerations in mind, and those consid-
erations would dovetail with well-established legal rules. Cases like Ziglar make the
Court’s policy view clear: unless Congress has decided otherwise, damages awards
against federal officers are suspect.327 As the Ziglar Court said, such potential liability
imposes significant “burdens on Government employees who are sued personally,
as well as . . . [on] the Government itself.”328
The policy goal of ensuring that the federal government operates free from un-
wanted burdens carries legal weight. Since McCulloch v. Maryland,329 the Supreme
Court has turned a skeptical eye toward states whose laws interfere with federal
319 See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426.
320 See id. at 428.
321 See id. at 427 n.7, 431–32.
322 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
323 See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150–51 (1988).
324 Id. at 151.
325 Careful readers may object that vindicating federal rights entails optimal rather than
maximal enforcement. The objection is sound, but its purchase depends on whether we’re near
optimal enforcement of any particular right. If only for the sake of argument, we presume
some federal rights are less than optimally enforced.
326 See, e.g., Felder, 487 U.S. at 139–40, 147.
327 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857–58 (2017).
328 Id. at 1858.
329 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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entities.330 There, the Court wielded the Supremacy Clause to strike down a Maryland
law taxing the national bank.331 The Court reasoned that “the power to tax involves
the power to destroy,” and a state had no right to destroy an entity duly created by fed-
eral powers.332 This reasoning hews closely to the Ziglar Court’s account of its own
inability to read Bivens broadly; its doing so would be too burdensome to the federal
government and its officers, at least as far as Congress was concerned.333 The Ziglar
Court saw Article III implications in these facts.334 But we might instead anticipate
Supremacy Clause problems of the variety explored in McCulloch, should a state
judiciary decide to read Bivens liberally. The power to award damages may not in-
volve the power to destroy, but it certainly involves the power to annoy.335 And if
the burden of damages goes significantly beyond annoyance, we should expect state
lawmakers—including courts exercising their common-law powers—to be forbidden
to authorize such actions unilaterally.
So Bivens remedies are unlikely to be more readily available in state than federal
court. But this is no strike against litigation in state court. It just means that, as far
as damages are concerned, state courts are no better for plaintiffs than their federal
siblings. But they are also no worse. The damages remedy is most likely available in
state courts to the same extent it is available in federal court.336
2. Injunctions
Injunctions are typically available in state courts for plaintiffs who prevail on
the merits of a claim while demonstrating that remedies at law are inadequate and
the public interest favors such relief.337 Apart from its substantive terms, the scope
of any injunction is a function of its duration and geography.338
Like federal courts,339 state courts may issue short-term injunctions (usually
called temporary restraining orders), preliminary injunctions (to preserve the status
330 See id. at 326–30 (describing how Maryland’s statute restrains, limits, and interferes
with the functions of the National Bank).
331 See id. at 436.
332 Id. at 431.
333 See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1858.
334 See id.
335 See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 347–48 (couching such annoyance in an example of the
states’ authority to tax and the “inconvenience and embarrassment” it may cause for banks).
336 See, e.g., Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 262, 264 (2011)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
337 Some variant of this standard is operative in every state. See Understanding In-
junctions, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/publications/insights_on_law_andsociety/14
/winter-2014/understanding-injunctions.html [https://perma.cc/C7LG-GH3N] (last visited
Apr. 12, 2018).
338 See id.
339 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
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quo pending litigation), and permanent injunctions (as final relief).340 Also like fed-
eral courts, state courts occasionally issue nationwide injunctions—those that regulate
the defendant’s conduct vis-à-vis the plaintiff throughout the country.341 For example,
an Illinois court might impose a nationwide ban on a businessman working for his
former employer’s competitors,342 or an Ohio court might impose a nationwide ban
on three musicians putting on a performance too similar to that of another group.343
Implicit in these cases is a fundamental principle: a state court may require someone
to do or refrain from doing something even outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction
so long as there exists personal jurisdiction.344
An especially coveted remedy for some impact litigators suing in federal court is
the national injunction.345 As distinguished from the nationwide injunction, the na-
tional injunction regulates a defendant’s conduct with respect to everyone, even non-
parties.346 For example, plaintiffs have obtained national injunctions from federal
courts that barred the Obama347 and Trump348 Administrations from executing their
immigration policies in favor of, and against, anyone. A burgeoning literature con-
siders the propriety of federal courts issuing such relief.349 Much of this literature is
skeptical.350 Yet much of this skepticism is grounded in Article III considerations,351
and Article III considerations of course drop out if a state court is doing the enjoining.352
Thus, counterintuitively, state courts may have a more authentic claim to power to
issue national injunctions than do federal courts. Indeed, in states where plaintiffs
340 See Understanding Injunctions, supra note 337.
341 See, e.g., WM Recycle Am., LLC v. Lavin, 2011 WL 10457477 (Ill. App. Ct. May 13,
2011); see also Cesare v. Work, 520 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Williams v. Powell
Elec. Mfg. Co., 508 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
342 See Lavin, 2011 WL 10457477, at *15.
343 See Cesare, 520 N.E.2d at 596–97.
344 See Lavin, 2011 WL 10457477, at *15.
345 See generally Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (2017).
346 On the distinction, see, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the
National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 418–19, 419 n.4 (2017).
347 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
348 See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated & dismissed as moot, 874
F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2017) (mem.).
349 See Bray, supra note 346, at 418; Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions?
Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other
Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 488 (2016); Siddique, supra note
345, at 2096. See generally Getzel Berger, Note, Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal
Government: A Structural Approach, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068 (2017).
350 See, e.g., Bray, supra note 346, at 419; Morley, supra note 349, at 494.
351 Morley, for example, argues that individual plaintiffs generally lack Article III standing
to secure injunctions barring the government from enforcing a law against third parties (what
Morley calls a “Defendant-Oriented Injunction”). See Morley, supra note 349, at 523–27.
352 See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (recognizing “that the
constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts”).
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are not required to demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury to sue,353 it is
difficult to imagine what an injunction would look like if not an order regulating a
defendant’s conduct generally.
A more complicated and consequential issue is whether state courts can enjoin
federal officials based on federal law.354 As a positive matter, nobody knows for
sure.355 The Supreme Court has dodged the question.356 In the face of this uncer-
tainty, we pick up where others have left off 357 and argue from first principles that
state courts should be understood to possess such power. More specifically, we
argue that state courts should be understood to possess such power inherently and
as an implication of the Supremacy Clause.358
Start with the argument for an inherent power. Article III, § 1 of the U.S.
Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested “in
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.”359 This embodies the Madisonian Compromise, in which
the Framers agreed that Congress would retain discretion to establish lower federal
courts.360 If lower federal courts need not exist as a constitutional matter, then we
ought to think the Framers understood state courts and state-court remedies to be
adequate for enforcing federal law against federal officials. Of course, the First
Congress exercised its discretion to create a system of lower federal courts.361 But
that innovation did not detract from the original power of the state courts.362 To the
contrary, when the First Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789,363 it chose to
withhold from the lower federal courts the general grant of federal-question jurisdic-
tion we now have in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.364 Suits under federal law against federal of-
ficers were to commence in state courts except in cases of diversity.365 It may seem
353 See discussion supra Section I.B.
354 Richard Fallon has described this as “one of the most fascinatingly arcane debates in
the law and theory of federal courts.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal
Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1202 & n.282 (1988).
355 See id. at 1202–07, 1202 n.282.
356 See Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 359–60 (1941) (declining to answer this question
of “grave consequence”).
357 See, e.g., Richard S. Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73
YALE L.J. 1385 (1964).
358 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
359 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
360 FALLON ET AL., supra note 72, at 6–8.
361 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
362 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 72, at 24 (discussing the First Judiciary Act’s origi-
nation of removal to federal courts as contingent on meeting a minimum amount in contro-
versy and identifying as an out-of-state defendant).
363 1 Stat. 73.
364 FALLON ET AL., supra note 72, at 22, 25.
365 James L. Bishop, The Jurisdiction of State and Federal Courts Over Federal Officers,
9 COLUM. L. REV. 397, 397 (1909).
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bewildering to modern minds that the Framers put so much faith in the state judicia-
ries. To the Framers themselves, it was natural that they should.366
The Supremacy Clause likewise implies an inherent power of state courts to en-
join federal officials based on federal law.367 To be sure, we are not contending that
the Supremacy Clause creates a cause of action for injunctive relief—the Supreme
Court rejected that argument in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Care Center, Inc.368
Our contention is instead that the Supremacy Clause presupposes a cause of action
for injunctive relief—a view consistent with Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court
in Armstrong369—and also the requisite authority to enjoin.
Embedded within the Supremacy Clause are two directives.370 First is that “[t]his
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”371 Second is that “the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”372 Splitting the text this way makes clear that
it singles out only state judges, commanding them to give unsparing effect to the
Constitution and federal law.373 Such a command apparently presupposes authority
to order compliance with federal law.374 And an exception to that authority in cases
366 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he laws of the Con-
federacy . . . will become the supreme law of the land; to the observance of which all
officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of
an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be
incorporated into the operations of the national government as far as its just and con-
stitutional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.”);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The judiciary power of every government
looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in civil cases lays hold of all subjects of
litigation between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of dispute are relative to
the laws of the most distant part of the globe. . . . When in addition to this we consider the
State governments and the national governments, as they truly are, in the light of kindred
systems, and as parts of one whole, the inference seems to be conclusive, that the State courts
would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the Union, where
it was not expressly prohibited.”).
367 Cf. Arnold, supra note 357, at 1401.
368 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015).
369 Id. (“What our cases demonstrate is that, in a proper case, relief may be given in a
court of equity . . . to prevent an injurious act by a public officer. The ability to sue to enjoin
unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity, and
reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to England.”
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
370 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 There is an extensive scholarly debate about why the Supremacy Clause singles out
state judges. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 245 n.60 (2000) (noting the
competing views).
374 The Supreme Court has made a similar point with respect to federal courts and state
officials. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 179 (1992) (“[T]he Supremacy
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against federal officials would make little sense in a system that trusts state courts
to hear cases arising under federal law.
Skeptics of state courts’ authority to enjoin federal officials cite nineteenth-
century decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that deny state courts’ authority to is-
sue writs of mandamus and habeas corpus directed at federal officials.375 For example,
in McClung v. Silliman,376 the Justices held that a state court lacked jurisdiction over
a suit for mandamus that would have compelled a federal officer to convey real
property.377 In Tarble’s Case,378 the Justices held that a state court lacked jurisdiction
to issue a writ of habeas corpus that would have effectively compelled an officer of
the United States Army to release an enlistee who had deserted.379 The opinions in
these cases deploy vaguely constitutional reasoning and are rooted in the notion that
a federal official “can only be controlled by the power that created him.”380 Yet
nineteenth-century decisions affirm the power of state courts to order specific relief
in actions at law against federal officials.381 For example, in Slocum v. Mayberry,382
Chief Justice Marshall affirmed a state court’s order of replevin against a federal cus-
toms official.383 In Stanley v. Schwalby,384 the Justices reversed a state court that had
concluded it was without jurisdiction to order ejectment against officers of the United
States Army.385 Tension between these contrasting lines of precedent is apparent: the
difference between an injunction, on one hand, and replevin or ejectment, on the other,
is of form rather than substance.386
Perhaps any deep objection to the thought of state courts enjoining federal offi-
cials stems from an intuition that the power to enjoin is the power to destroy. More than
an intuition, really, this is a takeoff on Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning in McCulloch
v. Maryland.387 We agree that uneasiness sets in when one thinks about the possibility
Clause makes federal law paramount over the contrary positions of state officials; the power
of federal courts to enforce federal law thus presupposes some authority to order state offi-
cials to comply.”).
375 Cf. Fallon, supra note 354, at 1202–07; Arnold, supra note 357, at 1390–93.
376 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821).
377 See id. at 603–05. Oddly, the Supreme Court purported to affirm the state court’s judg-
ment on the merits after deciding that the state court had been without jurisdiction. See id.
378 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872).
379 See id. at 411–12.
380 McClung, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 605; accord Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 406–
08; Fallon, supra note 354, at 1158–64, 1202–07.
381 See generally Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 (1893); Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S.
(2 Wheat.) 1 (1817).
382 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1 (1817).
383 See id. at 12–13.
384 147 U.S. 508 (1893).
385 See id. at 520.
386 See Arnold, supra note 357, at 1394–95.
387 See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819).
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of a state judge taking charge of the commanding heights of the federal government
through injunctions. But that uneasiness seems to reflect priors about how federal-
ism should work rather than any legal doctrine. As discussed above, McCulloch was
about a state interfering with a federal instrumentality through the application of
state law.388 Nothing in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion compels the conclusion that
state judges must refrain from enjoining federal officials to obey federal law.389
Indeed, far from the power to destroy, the power to enjoin federal officials to obey
federal law should be understood as the power to preserve a federal government of
laws and not men.
3. Declaratory Judgments
Declaratory relief is widely available in state court.390 As of this writing, forty
states have adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,391 which resembles the
federal statute.392 The remaining ten states have enacted different statutes that autho-
rize declaratory relief in many cases.393
Declaratory relief is noncoercive: It does not by itself impose legal obligations on
a party as does an award of damages or injunction.394 One might therefore conclude
that state courts can award declaratory relief in an action against a federal official
even if it seems doubtful that state courts may award damages or injunctive relief
against that same federal official.395 Yet jurisdiction to award declaratory relief is
usually tied up with jurisdiction to award coercive relief,396 and state courts generally
heed a presumption that public officials will follow the law as it is announced in a
declaratory judgment.397 So it may be that state courts’ power to award declaratory
388 Id. at 319 (“The question submitted to the Court for their decision in this case, is as to
the validity of the said act of the General Assembly of Maryland, on the ground of its being
repugnant to the constitution of the United States, and the act of Congress aforesaid, or to
one of them.”).
389 See generally id.
390 See, e.g., Jean E. Maess, Annotation, Right to Jury Trial in Action for Declaratory
Relief in State Court, 33 A.L.R. 4th 146 (1984).
391 See Declaratory Judgments Act: Enactment Status Map, NAT’L CONF. OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. LS., http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Declaratory%20
Judgments%20Act [https://perma.cc/49AF-4F4A] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
392 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012), with UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 1
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1922).
393 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1060 (West 2018); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3001 (MCKINNEY
2018).
394 Cf. Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486, 517–18 (1969) (“We need express no opinion
about the appropriateness of coercive relief in this case, for petitioners sought a declaratory
judgment . . . .”).
395 Cf. id.
396 See, e.g., City of Austin v. Util. Assocs., Inc., 517 S.W.3d 300, 317 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017).
397 See, e.g., Speicher v. Columbia Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 860 N.W.2d 51, 64 (Mich. 2014)
(Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
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relief in an action against a federal official depends on their power to enjoin that same
federal official, the thorny issue we evaluated above.398
B. Are State-Court Procedures Burdensome?
Litigants also might rationally prefer to litigate in federal court and risk dismissal
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction if state courts impose unique procedural hurdles.
Even if these hurdles are surmountable, the relative difficulty of litigating a case to
judgment could be enough to push a cost-conscious or time-sensitive plaintiff into
federal court. And even if the marginal costs are low and time plentiful, procedure
matters because it often bleeds into substance. This is a highly context-specific in-
quiry, of course, and here we only sketch some considerations.
Start with a procedural issue related closely to the discussion of remedies. Law
and equity merged in the federal system with the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938.399 Until then, a litigant seeking equitable relief in federal
court had to adhere to the Federal Equity Rules;400 a litigant seeking damages in fed-
eral court had to adhere to the forum state’s practice, typically rooted in either the
common law or Field Code;401 and a litigant seeking equitable relief and damages
had to navigate both.402 Merger yielded a single action in the federal system—the
“civil action”403—and brought with it simplicity and convenience.404
So might the complication from the residual separation of law and equity in states’
systems push plaintiffs into federal court? We doubt it. Only three states—Delaware,
Mississippi, and Tennessee—formally retain separate courts of law and equity.405 New
Jersey and Cook County, Illinois—home of Chicago—maintain separate divisions of
law and equity within the same court.406 And Georgia distinguishes law and equity
398 See supra notes 282–397 and accompanying text.
399 See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1004
(4th ed. 2015).
400 See Wallace R. Lane, Twenty Years Under the Federal Equity Rules, 46 HARV. L. REV.
638, 638 (1933).
401 This was a consequence of The Conformity Act, which required that the procedure in
the federal district courts conform “as near as may be” with that of the forum state’s trial
courts. See Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5–6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
402 See id. (applying the forum state’s rules of procedure to actions at law); see also Lane,
supra note 400, at 638 (discussing how Federal Equity Rules governed a suit in equity).
403 FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.”).
404 See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 399, § 1004.
405 See Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 538 &
n.31 (2016) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (2013 & Supp. 2014); MISS. CONST. art. VI,
§ 159; TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-11-101 (2009 & Supp. 2014); William T. Quillen & Michael
Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chancery—1792–1992, 18 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 819 (1993)).
406 See id. at 538 & n.32 (citing ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. S. CT. R. 135 (West 2009 & Supp.
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for jurisdictional purposes at the trial and appellate levels.407 These differences may
matter on the margin, but the impact seems de minimis.
Another consideration is the rules of discovery and evidence that apply in state
courts.408 This could be especially important to litigants who require a smoking gun
to survive a motion to dismiss, or expert testimony to meet their burden of proof on
a theory of causation.409 Of course, in federal court, federal rules apply.410 Discovery
is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.411 Expert testimony is governed
by the Federal Rules of Evidence,412 especially Federal Rule of Evidence 702413 and
the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.414
Litigants can take advantage of a body of precedent and academic work fleshing out
the positive and normative aspects of these regimes.415
So might the relative uncertainty from litigating under a state’s rules of discov-
ery and evidence push plaintiffs into federal court? Again, we doubt it. Start with
discovery. The federal rules are more uniform in aspiration than practice, a result of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83, which gives district courts authority to promul-
gate local rules.416 Nearly all district courts have invoked that authority, and commen-
tators have reflected on the variety that has resulted.417 As for evidence, many claims
present straightforward legal questions. Even claims that do rise and fall on, say, the
admissibility of an expert’s testimony are likely to meet the same fate in federal and
state court: thirty-two states have adopted rules mimicking Federal Rule of Evidence
702 and Daubert.418 We do not deny that litigating in state court means doing your
homework on that state’s rules of discovery and evidence. For litigators used to pro-
ceeding in federal court, that extra homework may matter on the margin. But again,
we suspect that the impact here is de minimis.
2015) (“Pleading Equitable Matters”); 9 ILLINOIS CIVIL TRIAL PROCEDURE §§ 2:2– 2:3 (2d ed.
2009 & Supp. 2014); N.J. CT. R. 4:3-1(a)).
407 See id. at 538 & n.33 (citing GA. CONST. art. VI, § 4).
408 See generally id.
409 See id. at 539–40.
410 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
411 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37.
412 See FED. R. EVID. 101.
413 FED. R. EVID. 702.
414 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
415 See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (Supreme Court precedent on
discovery under the Federal Rules); 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (3d ed. 2017) (academic work discussing the purpose of discovery).
416 See FED. R. CIV. P. 83.
417 See, e.g., A. Leo Levin, Local Rules As Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1574–75 (1991).
418 See Stephen J. McConnell & Sean P. Wajert, Daubert/Frye Motions in Product Lia-
bility Litigation: Bringing or Defending Challenges to Expert Witness Evidence, STRAFFORD
(June 10, 2015), http://media.straffordpub.com/products/daubert-frye-motions-in-product-lia
bility-litigation-2015-06-10/presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4XU-KZTF].
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A final consideration is the right to a jury trial.419 This is a constitutional entitle-
ment of litigants in federal court who seek damages.420 And it is one of the few entitle-
ments set out in the Bill of Rights that has not been incorporated against the states.421
The upshot is that a state is under no obligation to afford juries in civil actions unless
that state’s constitution or other rules require, or the action is to enforce a federal
right of which the jury trial is an indispensable part.422 These caveats are big—most
states have constitutional provisions that mirror the Seventh Amendment,423 and we
imagine that many litigants who seek to enforce federal law in state court, and who
seek damages, will be invoking a federal right that carries with it a jury trial. Accord-
ingly, there would be no disadvantage to litigating in state court along this dimension.
C. Have Litigators Succumbed to Irrational Biases?
The previous sections posited rational explanations for why impact litigators have
not exploited the Federal–State Standing Gap. Those explanations are inadequate.
Neither limitations on remedies nor procedural hurdles give litigants good reason to
struggle for standing in federal court rather than turning to the states.424 That leaves
irrational explanations. We posit two. First, a weak form of path dependence may
steer impact litigators toward federal, rather than state, court. Second, since many
impact litigators were educated at top law schools, clerked for federal judges, and have
spent most of their careers litigating in federal court, they may simply be too snobbish
to consider state-court litigation a live possibility.
The kind of path dependence we have in mind is not one that ought rationally
keep litigators from filing in state court and potentially using ASARCO’s path to fed-
eral review. It does not, for example, arise from a feedback effect via which the federal
courts became over time the rational venue for impact litigation. Rather, we propose
that impact litigators have been operating on autopilot, enacting a civil-rights-era
preference for federal litigation that no longer makes sense.
419 See Bray, supra note 405, at 539, 542–43.
420 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).
421 See Olesen v. Trust Co. of Chi., 245 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
896 (1957); see also Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 858 (7th Cir.
2009), rev’d and remanded on other grounds sub nom. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
U.S. 742 (2010).
422 See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952).
423 See Eugene Volokh, Opinion, Does the Seventh Amendment Civil Jury Trial Right
Apply to the States (and to Puerto Rico)?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 12,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/08/12/does-the
-seventh-amendment-civil-jury-trial-right-apply-to-the-states-and-to-puerto-rico/?utm_term=
.f025dc9a8978 [https://perma.cc/Q2UQ-EDHV].
424 See discussion supra Sections III.A–B.
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For civil rights impact litigators in the mid-twentieth century, federal courts were
almost certainly the right venue for litigation.425 State courts were then openly hostile
to civil rights claims.426 They were so unwilling to enforce federal civil rights laws
that some scholars have characterized them as “eschew[ing] the rule of law.”427 State
courts became so involved in enforcing Jim Crow laws that the Supreme Court even-
tually ruled that state-court enforcement of private racial covenants could constitute
state action and violate Equal Protection.428 Clearly, for mid-century impact litigators
hoping to leverage federal law to fight racial inequality, state courts were the wrong
place to be.429
Civil rights litigators learned their lesson. They turned to the federal courts to
enforce federal law and won historic victories.430 But perhaps they learned the lesson
too well. Maybe impact litigators working outside the area of civil rights and the era
of Jim Crow continue to assume that state courts will be reluctant to enforce federal
law. It is difficult to see why that should be right. State courts in the Jim Crow era
were not necessarily averse to enforcing all federal law; their objection was primar-
ily to laws fighting racial discrimination.431 So for litigants interested in enforcing
the Establishment Clause or the Emoluments Clause, there may never have been any
reason to think state court an inferior venue.
Recent events have proved that some states—at least their executive officials—
are now as eager as anyone to enforce federal law.432 The lead litigants bringing
challenges to the Trump administration’s policies have been states.433 Hawaii and
Washington led the charge in challenging Trump’s travel ban as violating the Estab-
lishment Clause and Due Process Clause.434 And, apparently in hopes that it would
avoid the standing challenges faced by CREW, Maryland has sued Trump for alleg-
edly violating the Emoluments Clause.435 Ironically, even though Maryland’s standing
425 See, e.g., Rachel D. Godsil, Race Nuisance: The Politics of Law in the Jim Crow Era,
105 MICH. L. REV. 505, 536, 542 n.232 (2006).
426 See id. at 507.
427 See id. at 507 & nn.4–5 (collecting scholarship).
428 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1948).
429 See Godsil, supra note 425, at 507.
430 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
431 See Godsil, supra note 425, at 533 (discussing how many southern state judges believed
in a legal theory that enabled them to not enforce federal laws, but for non-racial reasons).
432 See, e.g., Jaweed Kaleem, Six States Are Challenging Trump’s Travel Ban in Court,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017, 11:53 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na
-essential-washington-updates-washington-new-york-states-will-take-1489088278-htmlstory
.html [https://perma.cc/55N5-XN6T].
433 See id.
434 See id.
435 See Andrew Prokop, A New Lawsuit Is Trying to Force the Disclosure of President
Trump’s Tax Returns, VOX (June 13, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and
-politics/2017/6/13/15782218/trump-emoluments-lawsuit-maryland-dc [https;//perma.cc/9PSD
-SGU5].
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is a matter of some debate,436 it seems to have written off its own courts as potential
enforcers of the Constitution; it filed suit in federal court.437
This brings us to our second theory of irrational avoidance of the state courts. Per-
haps impact litigators are not laboring under the misguided civil-rights-era assumption
that state courts will not enforce federal law. Maybe they instead regard state courts
as comparatively incompetent.
State courts are much maligned by law professors, federal legislators, and the
defense bar.438 Note that these elite lawyers are among the least likely to have signif-
icant experience litigating in state court. Some such individuals regard the state courts
as “‘biased,’ ‘hostile,’ ‘discriminatory,’ ‘incompetent,’ ‘unprincipled,’ and ‘out-of-
control.’”439 Many states elect their judges, and elected judges are sometimes viewed
as less skillful and more corrupt than their appointed-for-life brethren.440 These
views are dubious.441 But whether they are right or wrong is, to an extent, irrelevant.
As we have discussed at length, impact litigators facing standing hurdles do not have
a choice between federal and state court.442 Because their plaintiffs have no federal
standing—and, given the nature of their challenge, no one may have it—their choice
is state court or nothing.443 And until now, they have often chosen nothing.444 Surely
no matter how much worse state court is than federal court, it is unreasonable to give
up rather than litigate there.
We do not mean to suggest that impact litigators are aware of ASARCO’s no-
standing path to the Supreme Court but consciously prefer no enforcement to state-
court litigation. Rather we suppose that the kinds of people who become active impact
litigators have failed to seriously consider state court as a venue for litigation. Such
people have little experience in state court and tend to regard it with fear or derision.445
And if no one is thinking about state-court litigation, no one will notice that ASARCO
provides a path from state court to the Supreme Court, plaintiff’s standing be damned.
436 See id.
437 See id.
438 See Jennifer Walker Elrod, Speech, Don’t Mess with Texas Judges: In Praise of the
State Judiciary, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 629, 630 (2014) (“In elite law schools, federal
courts get most of the attention and respect. State courts are often forgotten or (worse) viewed
with skepticism . . . .”); see also Willy E. Rice, Allegedly “Biased,” “Intimidating,” and
“Incompetent” State Court Judges and the Questionable Removal of State Law Class Actions
to Purportedly “Impartial” and “Competent” Federal Courts—A Historical Perspective and
an Empirical Analysis of Class Action Dispositions in Federal & State Courts, 1925–2011,
3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 419, 425–26 (2012).
439 Id. at 425.
440 See, e.g., Kent A. Gernander, Judicial Elections II, BENCH & B. MINN., Apr. 2001, at
5, 5.
441 See Rice, supra note 438, at 508–68 (studying state-court class actions to challenge the
idea that state courts have less skill and more prejudice).
442 See discussion supra Part I.
443 See discussion supra Part I.
444 See discussion supra Part I.
445 See supra notes 438–40 and accompanying text.
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IV. WHAT SHOULD WE THINK OF THE ASARCO RULE?
A. Is ASARCO Right as a Matter of Law?
ASARCO’s result is unexpected.446 It allows plaintiffs who would otherwise be
constitutionally barred from litigating in federal court to have their claims adjudicated
by the U.S. Supreme Court.447 As we describe, this subverts Article III, creating a path
by which no-standing litigants can avoid its requirements and obtain federal review.448
Given this, one might wonder if ASARCO is good law.
The dissenters did not think so.449 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia,
raised two major objections to the majority’s ruling.450 First, Article III required the
plaintiffs-respondents, rather than the defendants-petitioners, to show a cognizable
injury.451 Second, even if the defendants-petitioners’ standing was what mattered,
a state-court judgment against them is not an injury independently giving rise to an
Article III “case” or “controversy.”452
The idea that a defendant’s stake in a case might be sufficient for Article III
standing is unique to the ASARCO ruling.453 The majority ostensibly focused on the
defendants-petitioners’ standing because they were the ones first invoking the power
of the federal courts.454 But as the dissent noted, while other cases hold that a defen-
dant’s continuing interest might be necessary for federal review, no case holds that
it is sufficient.455
446 We are neither the first to notice nor the first to critique. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher,
The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions,
78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 264–65 (1990); Calvin Massey, Standing in State Courts, State Law,
and Federal Review, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 401, 404–05 (2015); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging
the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Theory that
Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1298–99 (2005). But
we are the first to explicate the opportunities ASARCO affords no-standing plaintiffs and re-
flect on why plaintiffs seem not to have taken full advantage. See discussion supra Section II.A,
Part III.
447 See Massey, supra note 446, at 404–05.
448 See discussion supra Section II.A.
449 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 634–37 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
450 See id.
451 See id. at 634–35.
452 See id. at 635–37.
453 See Pushaw, supra note 446, at 1298–99.
454 See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 635 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
455 See id. Note that Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013), can be read as com-
porting with this view. There, a federal district court held that California’s ban on gay mar-
riage was unconstitutional. Id. at 698–701. California declined to appeal. The Supreme Court
held that because no other putative defendant (or perhaps more accurately, no other appellant)
had a real stake in the case, there was no Article III case or controversy; it dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. Id. at 700–01. The absence of a defendant (appellant) with a real interest in
the case was fatal for federal review. Id. But nothing in Hollingsworth implies that, in the
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Furthermore, in contexts other than a petition for certiorari from a state court, the
federal courts focus on the plaintiff’s, not the defendant’s, standing.456 This is true
regardless of which party first invokes the power of the federal courts.457 Defendants
may remove a case from state court to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441,458 thereby
initiating federal review.459 Such defendants risk the same kind of injury incurred by
the ASARCO defendants—a judgment against them. But contrary to ASARCO, it is
the plaintiff’s standing, not the defendants, that matters in removal.460 The Supreme
Court has held that, when plaintiffs lack standing, the federal courts have no juris-
diction to hear a removed case.461
The same is true when a party who would otherwise be a defendant in a suit for
damages or an injunction brings an action for declaratory relief in federal court.462
Under the ASARCO rule, the declaratory plaintiff is the party first invoking the power
of the federal courts.463 We should therefore expect its standing to be sufficient. But
when a party bringing an action for declaratory relief is functionally a defendant—
when it is merely suing to preemptively trigger a lawsuit in which it would face dam-
ages or an injunction against it464—the declaratory plaintiff’s potential injury counts
for nothing.465
The Supreme Court has consistently held that, in such declaratory cases, it is the
functional plaintiff, not the formal declaratory plaintiff, who matters for jurisdictional
purposes.466 “[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act merely expands the remedies available
in the district courts without expanding their jurisdiction.”467 Federal courts evaluating
jurisdiction in declaratory actions must therefore imagine the hypothetical action for
absence of a plaintiff with a real stake in the case, the defendant’s (appellant’s) stake would
have been sufficient. See id. at 697–715.
456 See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“[A] plaintiff
must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press.” (citation omitted)).
457 See id.
458 Federal officers may remove pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2012). See discussion
supra notes 200–13 and accompanying text.
459 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012).
460 See, e.g., Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 77
(1991) (“[A] party may challenge a violation of federal statute in federal court if it has suf-
fered ‘injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant,’ and that is
‘likely to be redressed by the requested relief.’” (internal citations omitted)).
461 See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 n.3.
462 See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463
U.S. 1, 18–19 (1983) (“[F]ederal courts do not have original jurisdiction, nor do they acquire
jurisdiction on removal, where a federal question is presented by a complaint for a state
declaratory judgment . . . .”).
463 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 619 (1989).
464 See generally Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (2010).
465 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 19.
466 See id.
467 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring in judgment).
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damages or an injunction that could arise between the parties.468 That is, they imag-
ine a case that could have been brought without the aid of the Declaratory Judgment
Act.469 They then determine whether they would have jurisdiction over that case.470
For federal-question jurisdiction, “if, but for the availability of the declaratory judg-
ment procedure, the federal claim would arise only as a defense to a state created ac-
tion, jurisdiction is lacking.”471 Thus, when a declaratory plaintiff asks for a declaration
of federal right that would otherwise arise only as a defense to a state-law suit against
it, there is no jurisdiction.472 It is insufficient that the declaratory plaintiff raises a
federal question in its petition for the court to determine its rights.473 In other words,
despite the fact that the declaratory plaintiff is, under ASARCO, the party first seek-
ing federal review, its presentation of the case cannot establish jurisdiction.
The same logic applies to evaluating standing—rather than the presence of a fed-
eral question—in declaratory actions. Like the federal-question rule, Article III’s case-
or-controversy requirement is jurisdictional.474 If the Declaratory Judgment Act did
not expand the federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear federal questions, it also did not ex-
pand jurisdiction along the case-or-controversy axis.475 Before hearing a declaratory
case, then, federal courts must determine whether there would be standing in the re-
lated hypothetical coercive action.476 And in such a hypothetical action, the plaintiff’s
standing—not the defendant’s alone—would be a necessary condition on jurisdiction.477
The ASARCO rule thus is inapplicable in the two other situations where a func-
tional defendant initiates federal review. A defendant attempting to remove to federal
court cannot invoke its own standing to support jurisdiction.478 Nor can a party who
would otherwise be a defendant in state court present his own injury to a federal court
as a plaintiff in a declaratory action.479 The ASARCO majority’s rule is not only novel,
it is in tension with the weight of federal standing doctrine.480
468 See 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3566
(3d ed. 2008).
469 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 19.
470 See id.
471 Id. at 16 (citation omitted).
472 See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241–42 (1952); Ne.
Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R. Corp. v. Hoey Farina & Downes, 212 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“[I]f the plaintiff cannot get into federal court by anticipating what amounts to a federal defense
to a state-law cause of action, he also should not be able to use the Declaratory Judgment Act to
do so by asserting what is really a preemptive federal defense as the basis of his complaint.”).
473 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13–14.
474 It is actually more fundamental than the federal-question inquiry. The latter comes
from 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which is understood to be narrower than Article III, § 2. Standing in
federal court is a constitutional requirement. See discussion supra Section I.A.
475 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 19.
476 See id.
477 See id.
478 See id. at 18–19.
479 See id.
480 Compare id., with ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 619 (1989).
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One can understand the general practice of focusing on plaintiffs’, rather than
defendants’, standing by zooming out from standing’s narrow criteria and examining
Article III more broadly. The case-or-controversy requirement seeks, among other
things,481 adjudication of legal issues only when both parties have real skin in the
game.482 This prevents courts from deciding the law’s meaning “in the rarified at-
mosphere of a debating society.”483 Standing is just one of the formal lenses for
thinking about that goal. Other Article III doctrines like mootness484 and ripeness485
also police the requirement that both “parties maintain an ‘actual’ and ‘concrete’
interest” in the litigation.486
A defendant facing damages or an injunction certainly has skin in the game; the
potential judgment against him is his motivation. But that will more or less always
be the case. And under Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, it takes two
to tango; the point is ensuring that both parties will adequately argue the case.487
Merely noting that a judgment against the defendant will harm the defendant does not
do the trick.488 We also need to know whether the other party—the plaintiff—has
a serious interest.489
So a defendant facing a coercive judgment might be sensibly characterized, fol-
lowing the ASARCO majority, as having a redressable, traceable injury.490 But that’s
almost never the injury that matters. It can generally be assumed, and courts there-
fore usually turn immediately to the plaintiff’s injury to ensure that both parties are
in the case to win.491 Courts focus on the plaintiff’s standing because it is usually the
factor in doubt.492 If a defendant’s commitment to the litigation happens to be in doubt,
courts should also investigate it and, if it is found wanting, dismiss for lack of juris-
diction.493 Our examination of non-ASARCO standing doctrine suggests the following
481 Standing doctrine also works to preserve the Executive’s constitutional prerogative to
enforce federal law. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
482 See, e.g., Valley Force Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
483 Id.
484 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67–75 (1997).
485 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), abrogated on other grounds
by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
486 See Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1717 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment) (quoting Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016)).
487 See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
488 See id. (holding that as “the party who invokes the court’s authority,” the plaintiff must
show he is injured).
489 See id.
490 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 619 (1989) (finding that ASARCO, the
defendant-petitioner, suffered an injury that a favorable judgment would redress).
491 See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
492 See id. (suggesting that a plaintiff’s injury is an effective way to filter out abstract and
generalized cases).
493 See discussion supra note 455.
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rule: it is always necessary under Article III that an adverse decision will injure either
the plaintiff or the defendant, but only the prospect of injury to both is sufficient.
This insight allows us to quickly understand the ASARCO dissent’s second point—
that a judgment against a defendant is not a sufficient injury to support jurisdiction.494
The majority was right that the judgment against the defendant ensured that it was
invested in the case.495 But it was clear that the plaintiffs were never threatened with
physical harm, monetary loss, or any other traditionally cognizable but intangible
injury.496 From the outset, they would have failed the standing test—one of several
doctrines policing the case-or-controversy requirement.497 And, the dissent thought,
since both parties’ investment is a condition on any federal court’s jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court lacked power to hear the case.498
B. Is ASARCO Right as a Matter of Policy?
If, as suggested above, ASARCO’s legal foundation is shaky, why did the Supreme
Court decide as it did? One might suspect it had policy in mind. The legal puzzle of
ASARCO is complex, turning on who must be injured and how to present a case or con-
troversy under Article III.499 The policy dilemma is simple. ASARCO asked whether
some state-court decisions interpreting federal law are beyond the review of any fed-
eral court.500 The Supreme Court’s answer: no.501 In so answering, the Court reserved
to itself the power to conclusively interpret federal law.502
This policy dilemma did not go unnoticed in the ASARCO opinions. The dissent
thought it was “unremarkable” that state courts might “remain free to decide impor-
tant questions of federal statutory and constitutional law without the possibility of
review in this Court.”503 Even if no-standing state-court cases were unreviewable,
the dissent saw “no reason to fear that” the Court would be denied its “opportunity
to review many important decisions on questions of federal law.”504
The dissent was wrong. There are two ways in which our legal landscape sans the
ASARCO rule would be remarkable.505 First, contrary to the dissent’s position, there
494 See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 634–35 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
495 See id. at 634.
496 See id.
497 See id. at 616–17 (plurality opinion).
498 See id. at 634 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
499 See id. at 612 (plurality opinion).
500 See id. at 617.
501 See id. at 618–19 (majority opinion) (finding jurisdiction to review the Arizona Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the federal New Mexico–Arizona Enabling Act of 1910).
502 See id.
503 Id. at 636 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
504 Id. at 636–37.
505 Pushaw develops similar arguments on his way to calling for the Court to restructure
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would indeed be important questions of federal law that the Supreme Court would
have no opportunity to review.506 In such areas, state judiciaries who disagreed with
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law could defy the Court’s holdings.507
Second, even if state courts did their best to interpret federal law, they might often
disagree.508 In areas of law where standing is rare, this could lead to the permanent
fragmentation of federal law across state jurisdictions.
1. The ASARCO Rule Prevents State Courts from Openly Defying the Supreme
Court
A world without ASARCO might be quite remarkable. Standing doctrine prevents
many suits in federal court.509 But as we’ve illustrated, many of those suits could be
brought in state court.510 Suppose plaintiffs without standing begin to take advantage
of the Federal–State Standing Gap, litigating their federal claims in state courts.
With ASARCO, the Supreme Court has a chance to weigh in, reversing state courts
that get federal law wrong.511 Without ASARCO, there is no federal review of any
case where the plaintiffs lacked standing.512
This result—that the state courts issue unreviewable judgments based on federal
law—is perhaps strange. But is it worrisome? Maybe, if one expects state courts to
decide questions of federal law incorrectly. They might sometimes decide incorrectly
by accident. But an occasional state-court error in interpreting the law is no serious
cause for concern. The Supreme Court will generally get the chance to issue guid-
ance, and the misstep can be corrected.513
But state courts might also decide federal claims incorrectly on purpose. It is no
secret that states already bend federal law to serve their own, often partisan, purposes.
In Texas v. United States,514 conservative Texan officials leveraged the Administra-
tive Procedure Act and the Take Care Clause to oppose President Obama’s immigration
policies.515 In Hollingsworth v. Perry,516 liberal officials from California declined to
its jurisdictional doctrines so that it may review all cases presenting federal constitutional
questions. See Pushaw, supra note 446, at 1295–1300, 1341.
506 See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 636–37 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
507 See id. at 636.
508 See discussion infra Section IV.B.1.
509 See, e.g., ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 612–13 (plurality opinion).
510 See discussion supra Part I.
511 See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 623–24.
512 See id. at 618, 623–24.
513 See id. at 623–24.
514 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015).
515 See Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court to Hear Challenge to Obama Immi-
gration Actions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2jJYm6O. Ken Paxton, a Repub-
lican, was Attorney General of Texas at the time; he remains in that position as of this writing.
516 570 U.S. 693 (2013).
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challenge a circuit court’s opinion that the state’s same-sex marriage ban violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.517 In doing so, they essentially adopted their preferred reading
of federal law and denied the Supreme Court the opportunity to contradict them.518
State executive officials are not the only ones known to play politics. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court has been locked in a battle with the U.S. Supreme Court for years
about the validity of arbitration agreements.519 Justices of the California Supreme
Court, apparently sympathizing with consumers who sign such agreements, have
read the Federal Arbitration Act so inconsistently with U.S. Supreme Court prece-
dent that they have been said to be “dancing on their own.”520 Meanwhile, former
Chief Justice Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court resigned from his position
last year521 after being charged with ethics violations for ordering probate judges to
ignore the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.522 Upon resign-
ing, Moore defended himself as having stood up for “the people of Alabama . . . the
Constitution . . . [and] God.”523 These are just recent, salient examples: plenty of others
exist if one reaches back to the Civil Rights Era.524
States, acting through their officials and judges, have different interests than the
federal government, and they are willing to interpret federal law to serve those in-
terests.525 In some cases, they are willing to go so far as to openly defy the directives
of the U.S. Supreme Court.526 Without the ASARCO rule, no federal court could cor-
rect a state court’s defiance in any case without Article III standing.
517 See Maura Dolan & Carol J. Williams, Jerry Brown Again Says Prop. 8 Should Be
Struck Down, L.A. TIMES (June 13, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/13/local/me
-gay-marriage13 [https://perma.cc/4ZMP-HU58]. Jerry Brown, a Democrat, was Attorney
General of California at the time; he is Governor of California as of this writing.
518 See Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 702–03.
519 See Anna McLean & Joy O. Siu, Dancing on Their Own: The California Supreme
Court’s Decision in McGill v. Citibank, N.A. that Class-Action Waivers Do Not Apply to
Claims for Public Injunctive Relief Under California’s Consumer Protection Laws, SHEPPARD
MULLIN: CLASS ACTION STRATEGY DEF. BLOG (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.classactionde
fensestrategy.com/2017/04/articles/consumer/dancing-california-supreme-courts-head
-spinning-decision-mcgill-v-citibank-n-class-action-waivers-not-apply-claims-public-injunctive
-relief-cal/ [https://perma.cc/4VT6-VK5C].
520 Id.
521 Mike Cason, Roy Moore Running for Senate, Resigns from Supreme Court to Chal-
lenge Luther Strange, AL.COM (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.al.com/news/montgomery/index
.ssf/2017/04/roy_moore_announces_alabama_ch.html.
522 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment together guarantee a right to same-sex marriage).
523 Cason, supra note 521 (quoting former Chief Judge Moore’s remarks at a post-
suspension press conference).
524 See Godsil, supra note 425, at 507; cf. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
525 See supra notes 514–24 and accompanying text.
526 See Cason, supra note 521.
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Savvy state judiciaries and litigants could, if they wished, take advantage of this
fact. If, for example, the Ohio state judiciary disagreed with the Supreme Court about
who counts as a debt collector under federal law,527 it could telegraph its view to inter-
est groups. Those interest groups could then furnish a plaintiff—or class of plaintiffs—
able to sue in state, but not federal, court. The state court could rule in the plaintiff’s
favor, ignoring the Supreme Court’s understanding of federal law, and no one could
do anything about it.528
Could state courts really disregard the Supreme Court’s directives in such an open
fashion? Doesn’t the law require them to follow the Supreme Court’s holdings? Prob-
ably not. Constitutional scholars debate whether the coordinate branches of the federal
government are required to abide by the Supreme Court’s holdings.529 Everyone
agrees that the Supreme Court has the power to issue binding judgments in cases,
including those involving federal officers.530 But judgments formally bind only the
parties before the court.531 It remains an unresolved question whether, for example,
the executive branch may implement its own interpretation of the law when operating
outside the scope of a formal judgment against it.532
If there is legitimate doubt that the coordinate branches of the federal govern-
ment must follow Supreme Court holdings, there is less reason to think state judicia-
ries must do so. While state courts may be popularly regarded as lower courts, they
are not “inferior courts” in the constitutional sense.533 Inferior courts are those created
by Congress and vested with the “judicial Power of the United States.”534 State courts,
by contrast, predate the Constitution and wield the judicial power of fifty sovereign
states.535 The Supreme Court merely has appellate review over some state court deci-
sions, and that is only because Congress has passed a statute making it so.536
Even if the state courts formally retain the right to defy Supreme Court holdings,
maybe norms of adjudication prevent them from doing so. This, too, is unlikely. Even
some federal courts—true “inferior courts”—openly challenge the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of federal law, judicial norms notwithstanding.537 The Federal Circuit
527 See Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017).
528 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 612–13 (1989) (plurality opinion).
529 See generally, e.g., David W. Tyler, Note, Clarifying Departmentalism: How the
Framers’ Vision of Judicial and Presidential Review Makes the Case for Deductive Judicial
Supremacy, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2215 (2009); Kevin C. Walsh, Judicial Depart-
mentalism: An Introduction, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1713 (2017).
530 See Baude, supra note 285, at 1809–10; Walsh, supra note 529, at 1721.
531 See Walsh, supra note 529, at 1715.
532 See id. at 1721; see also Baude, supra note 285, at 1809–10.
533 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
534 Id.
535 See Arnold, supra note 357, at 1398.
536 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012).
537 See infra notes 538–40 and accompanying text.
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is notorious for this practice.538 It regularly performs intellectual contortions to avoid
conforming to the Supreme Court’s holdings.539 And Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the
Ninth Circuit has said that the Supreme Court “can’t catch . . . all” of his court’s
disobedient rulings.540 These federal judges are constrained by the possibility of
Supreme Court review and reversal.541 They are thus well served by couching their
nonconforming decisions in conformist language. But without ASARCO, state courts
would have many opportunities to stray without the threat of reversal.542 In such
cases, they would have no such conformist incentive and could disobey more openly
than any federal judge.
This is the primary policy effect of the ASARCO rule. It functions to ensure that
the federal judiciary, not those of the states, has the final say in all cases initiated under
federal law.543 In doing so, it heads off the possibility that a state judiciary could strike
off on its own, contorting federal law to serve its own preferences.
2. The ASARCO Rule Promotes the Uniformity of Federal Law
Assume now, as the Supreme Court regularly does, that the state courts are com-
petent, impartial adjudicators of federal questions.544 Then there is no concern that
states might systematically misinterpret federal law.545 What else is there to fear in a
world where state courts are the final arbiters of some federal claims? Fragmentation.
Recall that there may be no one with standing to raise certain questions about, for
example, the Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Statement and
Account Clause, or the Incompatibility Clause in federal court.546 Those questions
could, however, be raised in some state courts, and, without ASARCO, each state’s
highest court would be a terminal point of review.547 The United States has fifty state
judiciaries, and a significant minority of those have lax standing requirements.548
538 Federal Circuit, Never Change, FIRST MONDAYS (Oct. 31, 2016), http://www.first
mondays.fm/episodes/4 [https://perma.cc/DK8E-EXT3].
539 See id.; see also Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Understanding the Federal Circuit: An
Expert Community Approach, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89, 123–27 (2015).
540 Matt Rees, The Judge the Supreme Court Loves to Overturn, WKLY. STANDARD (May 5,
1997), http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-judge-the-supreme-court-loves-to-overturn/article
/2702 [https://perma.cc/58QF-UK6R] (quoting Judge Reinhardt).
541 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2012).
542 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617–24 (1989).
543 See id.
544 See, e.g., Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241 (1990) (“State courts are coequal parts of
our national judicial system and give serious attention to their responsibilities for enforcing
the commands of the Constitution.”).
545 See id.
546 See discussion supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.
547 See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 617–18, 623–24; see also id. at 634–36 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
548 See discussion supra Section I.B.
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Without ASARCO, such states might via competent, good-faith interpretation, come
to different results.549 The Supreme Court of Ohio might, for example, disagree with
the Supreme Court of Michigan regarding the contours of the Establishment Clause.
Such disagreement would create the equivalent of a circuit split among state rather
than federal courts. But without ASARCO’s path to Supreme Court review, the split
might persist indefinitely.550
Uniformity in federal law matters. Uniformity reduces forum shopping and al-
lows parties to confidently conform their activities to a known interpretation of the
law.551 Without uniformity in federal law, parties can find themselves subject to one
legal rule, should a plaintiff sue in one jurisdiction, and another, should it sue else-
where.552 Depending on the conflicting rules, parties may be put in an impossible
position wherein any course of action risks liability.553 Even barring such worst-case
scenarios, fragmented law increases compliance costs by effectively transforming a
single federal law into multiple rules varying across jurisdictions.554
Perhaps for these reasons, ensuring unity in the interpretation of federal law is
one of the Supreme Court’s primary jobs.555 The Rules of the Supreme Court of the
United States lists factors that the Court considers when deciding whether to grant
certiorari.556 Every factor mentions conflict—between federal circuit courts, federal
circuit courts and state courts, or any court and the Supreme Court.557 Indeed, one of
the reasons Congress made the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction mostly discretionary was
to allow it to focus on resolving splits in the lower courts.558 The ASARCO rule helps
the Supreme Court to perform its unifying role.559 It does so in a narrow range of
cases, but many of those cases bear on important constitutional questions.560
C. What Could Congress Do?
ASARCO has its problems, both legal and normative. But so would the world in
which ASARCO came out the other way. In any case, ASARCO is the law, as de-
termined by the Supreme Court.561 We suggested above that the Court may have
549 See discussion supra Section I.B.
550 See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 617–18, 623–24; see also id. at 634–36 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
551 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–78 (1938).
552 See id.
553 See id.
554 See supra note 549 and accompanying text.
555 See Wright v. North Carolina, 415 U.S. 936, 936–37 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
556 See U.S. SUP. CT. R. 10.
557 See id.
558 See Wright, 415 U.S. at 937 (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
559 See supra notes 545–57 and accompanying text.
560 See supra notes 546–50 and accompanying text.
561 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 623–25 (1989).
2018] THE FEDERAL–STATE STANDING GAP 1209
overlooked the surprising consequence of ASARCO—that it opens a lane for an end
run around Article III’s standing requirement.562 If the Court determined that ASARCO
was wrong, it could simply overturn its previous decision.563 It is uncontroversial that
the Supreme Court can correct what it deems past mistakes.564
In this section, we ask who else could modify the holding of ASARCO. Specifi-
cally, we ask how much power Congress has in this area. First, we investigate whether
Congress has the power to decide between the two worlds we describe above565—the
world of ASARCO and the world in which ASARCO came out the other way. It mat-
ters whether Congress has this power because, even if one thinks ASARCO wrongly
decided, there are reasons to doubt that the Court would overturn the decision.566
1. Could Congress Overturn ASARCO?
As discussed above,567 jurisdiction hawks may believe that ASARCO was wrongly
decided. They have good reason to think so, given the body of Supreme Court case
law on standing and the dissent in ASARCO itself.568 Such individuals might accept
the trade-off involved in overturning ASARCO—preferring sound Article III ju-
risprudence at the cost of empowering state courts to shape federal law free from
federal review. But it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will ever agree with such
individuals and overturn ASARCO. Practically speaking, ASARCO is a power grab
by the Court. For plaintiffs without federal standing, it shifts the final say on ques-
tions of federal law from the state courts to the Supreme Court.569 The Justices have
a history of seizing power from lower courts and state courts, and once power is
seized, it is rarely returned.570
If not to the Supreme Court, where might jurisdiction hawks look to overturn
ASARCO? Perhaps Congress.571 The question here is whether Congress has the power
562 See discussion supra Part II.
563 See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 386, 388, 400 (1937) (over-
ruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and abrogating Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
564 See id.
565 See discussion supra Section IV.B.
566 See discussion infra Section IV.C.1.
567 See supra notes 504–05 and accompanying text.
568 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 634–37 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
569 See id. at 618, 623–24 (majority opinion).
570 See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989) (requiring lower courts to deter-
mine whether a rule applies retroactively on collateral review before addressing the merits,
thereby depriving lower courts of authority to innovate in the area of constitutional criminal
procedure); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983) (establishing a presumption that
state courts decided a case on federal grounds when the case presents both federal and state
grounds for decision, thereby preserving the Court’s jurisdiction).
571 For purposes of this subsection, we use the term “overturn” narrowly. We are interested
here in whether Congress could pass a law implementing the same rule that the ASARCO
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to institute the rule that would exist if the Supreme Court overturned ASARCO. Could
Congress legislate a rule under which the Supreme Court never has jurisdiction to
review a ruling in a state-court case brought by a no-standing plaintiff?
It could. Article III sets out the maximal scope of the Supreme Court’s jurisdic-
tion.572 It specifically enumerates the Court’s original jurisdiction and appends a broad
swath of appellate jurisdiction.573 But under Article III, § 2, the Supreme Court’s ap-
pellate jurisdiction is subject to “such Exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make.”574
Congress can constrain the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court at will.575 The
Supreme Court endorsed this power in Ex parte McCardle,576 holding that Congress
could strip it of appellate jurisdiction in statutory habeas cases.577 Congress could
similarly pass legislation stripping the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in any
case where the plaintiff lacked Article III standing.578 The effect of such a law would
be identical to that of a Supreme Court decision overruling ASARCO.
2. Could Congress Fashion a Third Way?
It is not clear from a normative or a legal perspective whether one should prefer
our actual legal world or one in which ASARCO was overturned. Our actual world al-
lows plaintiffs without Article III standing to enforce federal laws in federal court.579
But if the Supreme Court had held that there was no standing in ASARCO, state courts
would be free to fashion their own versions of federal statutory and constitutional
law.580 They could even do so in defiance of the U.S. Supreme Court.581 Presented
with these two alternatives, one might seek a third.
The rock-and-a-hard-place nature of the two choices here follows from the
Federal–State Standing Gap. If federal and state courts shared standing requirements,
no one could bring a no-standing suit in a state court, win, and then get Supreme
Court review (the problem with the ASARCO rule).582 Nor could state courts decide
important cases involving federal law that would be shielded from federal review
(the problem without the ASARCO rule).583 To fashion a third way, then, Congress
would need to eliminate the Federal–State Standing Gap.
Court would have implemented had it decided the case differently. Other rules that Congress
could implement to displace ASARCO might also be thought of as “overturning” it; we deal
with those next.
572 See U.S. CONST. art. III.
573 See id. § 2.
574 Id.
575 See id.
576 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
577 See id. at 513–14.
578 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
579 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618, 623–24 (1989).
580 See id. at 636–37 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
581 See discussion supra Part II.
582 See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 617–18.
583 See id. at 636–37 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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How could Congress perform such a feat? It could strip state courts of some of
their jurisdiction to hear cases arising under federal law. It is uncontroversial that
Congress has the power to establish exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts over
certain categories of cases.584 Under current law, state courts have no jurisdiction to
hear bankruptcy, antitrust, patent, and copyright cases, among others.585
If Congress can establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over particular areas of
law, it could also strip state courts’ jurisdiction in cases without Article III standing.
Establishing exclusive federal jurisdiction just is stripping the state courts of juris-
diction in a class of cases. The federal courts presumptively have jurisdiction to hear
all cases “arising under [the] Constitution [and] the Laws of the United States.”586 And
unless Congress says otherwise, the default rule is that states have concurrent ju-
risdiction over the same.587 So when Congress establishes exclusive jurisdiction in
federal court over, say, patent cases, it is merely stripping the state courts of their
presumptive jurisdiction.588 We propose that nothing is to stop Congress from enact-
ing a law that, instead of stripping state court jurisdiction based on the content of
cases, strips it based on the traditional elements of federal plaintiffs’ standing.589 It
could therefore enact legislation barring state courts from hearing cases arising under
federal law unless the traditional elements of Article III standing were present.
If Congress were to strip state courts of jurisdiction in cases where no plaintiff
had Article III standing, the Scylla and Charybdis of ASARCO and its negation would
dissolve. Under such a regime, standing would remain an absolute requirement for
litigation in all federal courts, including the Supreme Court. The method we’ve de-
scribed for enforcing federal law in federal court without Article III standing would
no longer work. If one were to attempt to bring one’s no-standing case in state court,
the state court would be obliged to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Since federal courts
have always been obliged to do the same,590 the litigation would end there. Such a law
would patch the Federal–State Standing Gap. This would be bad news for CREW,
as it would once again have to contend with standing doctrine in its Emoluments
Clause suit against Trump. It would also be bad news for litigants who wish to en-
force otherwise unenforceable constitutional doctrines.
584 See, e.g., Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 446–47 (1994); The Moses Taylor,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 430 (1866).
585 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 1337, 1338 (2012) (bankruptcy, antitrust, and patent and copy-
right, respectively).
586 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
587 See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 735 (2009).
588 See id. (explaining that Congress can “expressly oust[ ] state courts of jurisdiction”).
589 Cf. Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224–34 (1948) (arguing that the power of Congress to grant federal-
question jurisdiction “should extend . . . to all cases in which Congress has authority to make
the rule to govern disposition of the controversy” whether or not it exercises that authority).
590 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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The jurisdiction-stripping rule would also avoid the problems that a mere
“overturn” of ASARCO would engender. If Congress required Article III standing
in state court cases based on federal law, there could no longer be any unreviewable
state-court cases interpreting federal law. The only cases in which a state court could
interpret federal law would be those in which the plaintiffs had standing to sue. Even
without ASARCO, such cases would be reviewable by the Supreme Court.591 Under
such a regime, states could still employ their own relaxed standing requirements when
interpreting their own laws. But the possibility of rogue state judiciaries reshaping
federal statutory or constitutional provisions would be eliminated.
CONCLUSION
Article III standing doctrine is often a thorn in litigators’ sides. Because of it,
people with a sincere interest in enforcing federal law find that they cannot. And, as
with CREW, impact litigators sometimes discover that locating a plaintiff with stand-
ing to sue is more easily said than done. Until now, a lack of standing—either in a
single case or across the population of potential litigants—has been assumed to be an
absolute bar to judicial redress.
The time has come to challenge that assumption. As we show, the state courts
are viable alternative forums in which private parties may enforce federal law. They
are not subject to Article III’s standing requirement.592 They are able to issue largely
the same remedies as the federal courts against—we argue—the same parties. It is
even possible that state courts have more power in constitutional cases to issue dam-
ages judgments against federal officials.593 Finally, for impact litigants hoping to
influence national law, the state courts offer a route to what they want most—federal
Supreme Court review—even for plaintiffs without standing.594 Standing doctrine, as
it turns out, should essentially never be treated as an obstacle to enforcing federal law.
You, too, it turns out, can sue Donald Trump under the Emoluments Clause—or any
other federal law—no standing required.
591 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2012).
592 See discussion supra Section I.B.
593 See discussion supra Section III.A.
594 See generally ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
